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I SWEAR! FROM SHOPTALK TO SOCIAL
MEDIA: THE TOP TEN NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD PROFANITY CASES
CHRISTINE NEYLON O’BRIEN†
INTRODUCTION
Two waitresses at Hooters got into a swearing match with
another waitress who had won a mandatory bikini competition
that was rumored to have been rigged in favor of the winner.1
The two losing waitresses were terminated for yelling obscenities
at their winning coworker in front of customers.2 An off-duty
barista at a New York Starbucks repeatedly used profanity in a
heated conversation with a manager in the presence of
customers, and was fired for his conduct.3
Employees at a Manhattan catering service complained to
the director of banquet services about the hostile, degrading, and
disrespectful treatment they received from managers.4 The
employees filed a representation petition at the National Labor

†
Professor of Business Law, Carroll School of Management, Boston College;
B.A., Boston College; J.D., Boston College Law School. The author wishes to thank
Andrew Miller, M.B.A./J.D. candidate Boston College 2015, for his research
assistance on this Article.
1
Hoot Winc, LLC (Hooters of Ontario I), No. 31-CA-104872, slip op. at 13, 2014
WL 2086220 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges May 19, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31CA-104872, aff’d, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 2015 WL 5143098, at *2 (Sept. 1, 2015)
(upholding ALJ on illegality of mandatory arbitration agreement that required
employees to waive all class and collective action in all forums, whether arbitral or
judicial). As noted in the Board’s 2015 Hooters opinion, “the parties executed an
informal Board settlement agreement and a non-Board settlement agreement
resolving all alleged violations other than those pertaining to the maintenance of the
arbitration agreement.” Hoot Winc, LLC (Hooters of Ontario II), 363 N.L.R.B. No. 2,
2015 WL 5143098, at *1 n.1 (Sept. 1, 2015).
2
Hooters of Ontario I, slip op. at 15.
3
Starbucks Corp. (Starbucks IV), 360 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 2014 WL 2736112, at
*2 (June 16, 2014).
4
Pier Sixty, LLC (Pier Sixty II), 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688, at *1
(Mar. 31, 2015).
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Relations Board5 (“NLRB”) and an election resulted in
certification of the union’s majority status.6 However, two days
before the election, three employees who were serving drinks
from trays were repeatedly told by an assistant director to spread
out and stop talking.7 One server took a break and posted
profane remarks about the assistant director on his personal
Facebook page, and included a plea to vote for the union.8 The
server was terminated for his vulgar Facebook comments.9
In the midst of a labor dispute at a tire company, the
employer locked out the bargaining unit employees.10 The union
members staffed a peaceful picket line.11 On an evening when
the union sponsored a hog roast at the hall adjacent to the plant
entrance and the picket line, some of the locked-out employees
engaged in profanity, name-calling, and vulgar gestures such as
pointing their middle fingers upwards at the replacement
workers who were crossing the picket line in vehicles.12 The
locked-out workers demanded that the replacements “go home”
and not steal their jobs.13 A locked-out employee was terminated
for, among other things, yelling out: “Hey, did you bring enough
KFC for everyone?” And later, “Hey, anybody smell that? I smell
fried chicken and watermelon.”14 Many of the replacement
workers were of African-American descent, and the company had
a policy prohibiting racial harassment.15
These employees were all terminated for their use of
profanity aimed at coworkers, managers, and strikebreakers.
Should they get their jobs back? The examples above reference
facts in recent cases that were brought to the NLRB by

5
The National Labor Relations Board or NLRB is also referred to as the Board
in this Article.
6
Pier Sixty, LLC (Pier Sixty I), No. 2-CA-068612, slip op. at 4, 2013 WL
1702462 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Apr. 18, 2013), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/02-CA068612, aff’d, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688, at *1 (Mar. 31, 2015).
7
Pier Sixty II, 2015 WL 1457688, at *1.
8
Id. at *2.
9
Id.
10
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. 08-CA-087155, slip op. at 2–3, 2015 WL
3544120 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 5, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/08-CA087155.
11
Id. at 3.
12
Id. at 4–5.
13
Id. at 4.
14
Id. at 4–6.
15
Id. at 3, 6.
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employees or their unions against Hooters,16 Starbucks,17 Pier
Sixty,18 and Cooper Tire and Rubber Company.19 In all of these
cases, as well as in others, the NLRB or an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) ordered reinstatement of the employees because
the conduct for which the employees were terminated was
protected concerted activity under § 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”).20
Why is profanity protected under § 7 of the NLRA? Section 7
grants private sector employees who are protected by the Act,
whether or not they are members of a union, the right to engage
in protected concerted activity, which includes communication
regarding: organization, or refraining from such; wages, hours,
and working conditions; and other concerted activities for mutual
aid or protection, all of which provide employees with a bare
bones workplace bill of rights.21 Employees must be acting in
concert and within these defined subject areas for their
communication to fall within the umbrella of § 7’s protection.22
The concept of acting in concert generally involves two or more
employees acting together, but the concept also includes one
employee involving another coworker before acting, or one
employee acting on the behalf of others, for the benefit of more
than just the acting employee.23 If employees engage in conduct
that is not concerted, or that exceeds the boundaries of protected
activity because it is reckless, malicious, or violent, then they are

16
Hooters of Ontario I, No. 31-CA-104872, 2014 WL 2086220 (N.L.R.B. Div. of
Judges May 19, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-104872, aff’d, 363 N.L.R.B.
No. 2, 2015 WL 5143098 (Sept. 1, 2015).
17
Starbucks IV, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 2014 WL 2736112 (June 16, 2014).
18
Pier Sixty II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688 (Mar. 31, 2015).
19
Cooper Tire, No. 08-CA-087155, 2015 WL 3544120.
20
Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
21
See Christine Neylon O’Brien, Am I Blue or Seeing Red? The NLRB Sees
Purple When Employer Communication Policies Unduly Restrict Section 7 Activities,
66 LAB. L.J. 75, 75–76 (2015); see also Rights We Protect: Protected Concerted
Activity, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/protected-concerted-activity
(last visited May 18, 2016).
22
O’Brien, supra note 21.
23
Id. at 75.
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not protected by § 7.24 The concept of protected concerted activity
allows for some impulsivity and posturing regarding collective
bargaining, grievances, picketing, and strike activity, as such
behavior is expected in light of the confrontational nature of
these activities.25 Profanity may be part of the impulsive
dialogue between employers and employees as both sides seek to
arrive at industrial peace in these contexts.
There are many recent NLRB cases that involve profanity,26
and this type of conduct—or misconduct, depending upon your
point of view—is far from new.27 After all, swearing is hardly a
modern invention.28 Nonetheless, engaging in profanity at work
or with coworkers online is certainly controversial, especially
when the profanity is directed at managers or when it harms the
company’s reputation.29 It seems that in the early days of the
NLRA, some allowance was made for rougher talk among men at
work than that which was expected to take place in normal civil

24
Id. See Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB
Div. of Advice, to Gail R. Moran, Acting Reg’l Dir., Region 13, regarding JT’s Porch
Saloon & Eatery, Ltd., No. 13-CA-46689, 2011 WL 2960964 (July 7, 2011), available
at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA-046689 (finding that bartender who was
terminated for engaging in profanity and making negative remarks on Facebook to
his step-sister about the employer’s tipping policy and its customers was not
engaged in concerted activity because he did not discuss the policy with fellow
employees before or after he wrote the posts).
25
See Bettcher Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. 526, 527 (1948) (noting debate without
censorship inherent in collective bargaining process for employee to be perceived as
equal to employer in context of trading and bargaining negotiations, and that
employee discharge for engaging in frank exchange of views would discourage
membership in the grievance committee).
26
See The Hooters Precedent; The NLRB Says You Can Tell Your Boss to @$%#!
and Still Keep Your Job, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/the-hooters-precedent-1411426971 (discussing an article authored by
employment law lawyers that noted a trend in Hooters, Starbucks Corp., and other
cases where the NLRB sides with employees who insulted their employers, thereby
condoning profanity and insubordination).
27
See Katy Steinmetz, Nine Things You Probably Didn’t Know About Swear
Words, TIME (Apr. 10, 2013), http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/04/10/nine-things-youprobably-didnt-know-about-swear-words/ (noting swear words have been around
since the time of our forebears’ forebears).
28
See Melissa Mohr, The Modern History of Swearing: Where All the Dirtiest
Words Come From, SALON (May 11, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.salon.com/
2013/05/11/the_modern_history_of_swearing_where_all_the_dirtiest_words_come_fr
om/ (discussing swearing in the 18th and 19th centuries including the use of the
word “bloody”).
29
See Bettcher Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. at 526–27, 533 (involving employee fired
for implying president/treasurer of company was manipulating the books to evidence
a loss, intimating that he was a “crook and a liar”).
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society.30 Thus, some swearing at managers was permitted if
employees were engaged in what was defined as protected
concerted activity under the NLRA.31 Men were practically
expected to swear at work in the context of letting out their
thoughts and complaints relating to their jobs.32 The NLRB
seemed to accept that horrible bosses cause employees to swear!33
In light of the underlying purpose of the NLRA—to redress the
imbalance of power between employers and employees—
uncensored comments were often excused because of the
posturing that takes place in the context of collective bargaining,
or during the resolution of grievances.34 While the Board
recognized that some of the use of profanity was mere shoptalk,
it noted:
A line exists beyond which an employee may not with impunity
go, but that line must be drawn “between cases where
employees engaged in concerted activities exceed the bounds of
lawful conduct in ‘a moment of animal exuberance’ . . . or in a
manner not activated by improper motives, and those flagrant
cases in which the misconduct is so violent or of such serious
character as to render the employee unfit for further service.”35

Today, both male and female employees may swear,36 and
they may do so in all sorts of contexts: in person, with statements

30

See id. at 535.
See Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 345, 347 (1982) (finding employee
profanity protected as spontaneous outburst in grievance proceeding or collective
bargaining, or if provoked by employer unfair labor practice). Cf. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 276 N.L.R.B. 1323, 1324–26 (1985) (upholding discharge of employee because
profane cartoon depicting supervisor as razorback pig urinating on workers not
protected as it was a vicious personal attack).
32
See Bettcher Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. at 527.
33
This brings to mind the comedy act by The Jerky Boys, “Hurt at Work.” The
Jerky Boys, Hurt at Work, WN.COM (July 21, 2011), http://wn.com/the_jerky_boys__hurt_at_work.
34
See Bettcher Mfg. Corp., 76 N.L.R.B. at 527 (noting context of protected
concerted activities that results in posturing).
35
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Ill. Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811, 815–16 (7th Cir. 1946)
(quoting Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chi., Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941))).
36
Note that the Hooters case involved women swearing at a work-related event.
Hooters of Ontario I, No. 31-CA-104872, slip op. at 13, 2014 WL 2086220 (N.L.R.B.
Div. of Judges May 19, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-104872, aff’d, 363
N.L.R.B. No. 2, 2015 WL 5143098 (Sept. 1, 2015). See also Copps Foods, 323
N.L.R.B. 998, 999, 1001 (1997) (upholding termination of female baker who swore at
supervisor, saying: “This is f—king bullshit. This is one asshole company to work
for”).
31
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or designs on apparel or buttons, on informational flyers in an
employee breakroom, or via email and social media in the virtual
world. So, conversations that include profanity may take place
on the shop floor, in a retail setting, in a parking lot, or on social
media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.
How should the NLRB rule with respect to the use of profanity in
each of these contexts? Does a retail setting call for completely
curtailing employee profanity regardless of the subject matter?
Should the relative status of those doing the swearing matter?
Should the reach of the communication, in terms of size and
composition of the audience, dictate the outcome? Should the
conduct and the values of the employer make a difference?
Is it the profanity itself that is so problematic to the
employer or is it the disrespect or disloyalty that is reflected in
the profanity? Employers and managers do not want to be
insulted or lose control of employee behavior.37 Most employers
seek to prevent profanity from harming the image of the
company or its brand. Sometimes the employer’s concern focuses
on how the employee treats the boss, and how this impacts the
management of other employees because of an apparent lack of
control regarding outbursts. Other times the employer’s concern
focuses on the negative impact of such language on its customers
in, for example, a retail setting. At some point, one wonders just
how much profanity the employer is required to tolerate simply
because it occurs in the context of employees’ protected concerted
activity. Is shoptalk in the workplace on nonworking time more
or less protected than online talk on social media that takes place
on the employees’ own time? In the era of social media, the
employer’s concern with preserving the company’s reputation is
clearly exacerbated because of the reach and immediacy of online
communication, but in some respects, discussion on social media
has less impact on an employer’s maintenance of production and
discipline than workplace discussions that include profanity.
How should the NLRB balance the interests of employers with
employees’ exercise of § 7 rights when it includes profanity?


37
The Board has long recognized the employer’s right to demonstrate special
circumstances requiring it to implement rules necessary to maintain production or
discipline even if these rules have some restrictive impact upon protected concerted
activity. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945).
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The Board has worked to adapt its standards for protected
concerted activity from face-to-face communication to electronic
communication, including social media.38 As will be discussed in
Part III, the NLRB has recognized in recent cases that some of
the factors weighed to determine if an employee’s outburst of
profanity should lose protection vary depending upon the
medium, the context, the provocation, the audience, and the
actors.39
This Article curates and analyzes ten recent cases where the
NLRB decided whether or not § 7 protected employee swearing,
with a view toward defining the implications of these decisions
for employers and employees in terms of employer rules and
discipline, and employee rights and limits thereon.40 The Article
outlines the NLRB’s role and perspective in cases where
employees are disciplined or discharged for engaging in profanity
at work and/or on social media when the conduct in question is
otherwise protected concerted activity.41 The Article summarizes
the facts in each case while analyzing the legal framework that
the NLRB uses to evaluate whether the conduct is protected,
and, even if it is, whether the employee loses the protection of the
NLRA because of the egregiousness of the employee’s conduct, as
it weighs the totality of the employee’s conduct objectively.42
Further, the Article discusses: (1) employer rules relating to
profanity that run afoul of the NLRA because they unduly
interfere with employee exercise of protected concerted activity,
and (2) the Board’s ongoing directive to revise such rules as part
of its remedy for these employer unfair labor practices.43
Whether the employee conduct is face-to-face or on social media,
the NLRB sets standards on what communication is protected

38
See Michael Z. Green, The NLRB as an Überagency for the Evolving
Workplace, 64 EMORY L.J. 1621, 1630 (2015) (noting importance of NLRB’s action in
addressing new forms of digital-age communications); Christine Neylon O’Brien, The
National Labor Relations Board: Perspectives on Social Media, 8 CHARLESTON L.
REV. 411, 413–14 (2014) (discussing NLRB tests on employer social media policies
and related rules); Christine Neylon O’Brien, The Top Ten NLRB Cases on Facebook
Firings and Employer Social Media Policies, 92 OR. L. REV. 337, 375 (2013) (noting
NLRB was applying same rules for protecting employees’ concerted activity to social
media cases).
39
See infra Part III.A, C.
40
See infra Parts II–III.
41
See infra Parts II–III.
42
See infra Parts II–III.
43
See infra Part VI.
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and what is not, depending upon whether the subject matter falls
within § 7 and whether the employee crosses the line into
behavior that the Board finds does not deserve the protection of
the Act.44 The survey includes NLRB cases involving employees
swearing in a face-to-face context using union buttons, and other
union materials, and on email and social media.
I.

THE TOP TEN NLRB PROFANITY CASES

The following table summarizes information on the top ten
recent NLRB profanity cases analyzed in this Article. The
categories include the case name and number, and the source of
authority—whether a decision of the NLRB itself, or a decision of
an ALJ, which has not yet been heard by the NLRB. Next is the
date of the latest decision in each case, followed by the outcome
of the unfair labor practice (“ULP”) charges filed, what remedy
was ordered, and the current status of appeal or compliance as
noted on the NLRB case pages.45 In all ten cases, at least one
employee was discharged. Commonly, the NLRB orders the
respondent-employer that has violated the NLRA to post a notice
indicating that it will not commit the ULP again in the future.
Thus, in the cases where ULPs were found, this is a routinely
ordered remedy.46 The next column indicates whether there was
a union present, whether a union was organizing, or if there was
no union at all. Finally, in the context of profanities in the
workplace, the cases indicate if it involved face-to-face
communication, union buttons or other union insignia, defacing
union materials in an employee breakroom, or social media. The
cases are organized with the first five involving face-to-face
conduct, the next four involving communication on social media,
and the last involving materials on a breakroom bulletin board.


44

See infra Part VI.
See the case pages, available at http://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions/boarddecisions, for the latest information on the status of open cases.
46
In cases where employers have policies that violate the Act and apply beyond
the instant geographic site, the employer is required to revise the policies and post a
remedial notice across all of its facilities, including electronic notice where that
medium is available and customarily used for communication to employees. J & R
Flooring, Inc., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 2010 WL 4318372, at *1 (Oct. 22, 2010) (noting
remedial posting should include electronic notice where such notice is customary
mode of communication).
45
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Table of Top Ten NLRB Profanity Cases
Top
Ten
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Source of
Authority

Date

Outcome, Remedies, Status

NLRB
ALJ

5/19/14

NLRB

9/1/15

Reinstatement & Backpay
Revise Overly Broad Rules; Post
Notice No More ULPs;
Settlement Agreement Reached
10/22/14;
Board Upheld Illegality of
Mandatory Arbitration Agreement
9/1/15;
Appeal Filed, 9th Cir., Case Nos. 1572839, 15-72931

Plaza Auto
Ctr., Inc.
28-CA022256

NLRB

5/28/14

Starbucks
Corp.
02-CA037548

NLRB

Pac. Bell Tel.
Co.
20-CA080400

NLRB

Cooper Tire
& Rubber
Co.
08-CA087155

NLRB
ALJ

6/5/15

Triple Play
34-CA012915

NLRB

8/22/14

Bettie Page
Clothing
20-CA035511

NLRB

Pier Sixty,
LLC
02-CA068612 &
02-CA070797

NLRB

Tinley Park
Hotel &
Convention
Ctr., LLC
13-CA141609

NLRB
ALJ

6/16/15

Fresenius
USA Mfg.,
Inc.
02-CA039518

NLRB

6/24/15

Case Name
Hoot Winc,
LLC
31-CA104872

6/16/14

6/2/15

10/21/15

10/31/14

3/31/15

Reinstatement & Backpay;
Post Notice No More ULPs;
Compliance Closing Letter 11/21/14
Reinstatement & Backpay;
Post Notice No More ULPs;
Compliance Closing Letter 6/25/15
Reinstatement & Backpay;
Revise Overly Broad Rule re: Union
Insignia & Buttons; Post Notice No
More ULPs;
Appeal Filed, D.C. Cir., Case No. 1573034
Reinstatement & Backpay;
Post Notice No More ULPs;
Exceptions to ALJ Decision Filed
7/20/15;
Appeal Pending at NLRB
Reinstatement & Backpay;
Revise Overly Broad
Internet/Blogging Policy;
Post Notice No More ULPs;
Second Circuit Aff’d 10/21/15
2015 WL 6161477 (2d Cir. Oct. 21,
2015) (Summary Order)
Reinstatement & Backpay; Revise
Rules re: Salary Disclosure,
Confidentiality, etc.;
Post Notice No More ULPs;
Appeal Filed, D.C. Cir., Case No. 141232;
Oral Argument 1/21/16
Reinstatement & Backpay;
Post Notice No More ULPs;
Appeal Filed, 2d Cir., Case Nos. 151841, -1962;
Oral Argument Scheduled for 4/5/16
Reinstatement & Backpay;
Revise Overly Broad Rules re
Disloyalty, Confidentiality,
Disrespectful/Disruptive Conduct;
Post Notice No More ULPs;
Transferred to NLRB 6/16/15;
Exceptions to ALJ Decision 7/14/15;
Appeal Pending at NLRB
Dishonesty not Protected;
Discharge Upheld but
Cease and Desist Prohibiting
Employees from Discussing
Investigations; Post Notice No More
ULPs; Compliance Certification of
Posting 7/30/15;
Compliance Closing Letter 11/9/15

Union
Presence

Context

No Union

Face-to-Face

No Union

Face-to-Face

Union Was
Organizing

Face-to-Face

Union

Face-to-Face,
Union Buttons
& Shirts

Union

Face-to-Face,
Picket Line,
Racial
Harassment
Policy

No Union

Facebook

No Union

Facebook, Some
Face-to-Face

Union
Organizing
Election
Pending

Facebook

No Union

Facebook

Union
Decertification
Election
Pending

Employee
Defaced Sign in
Breakroom;
Dishonesty in
Investigation of
Sexual
Harassment
Claims
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II. FACE-TO-FACE CASES
The following five cases involve employees who engaged in
vulgar, profane interactions with coworkers or managers in a
face-to-face context. These employees were discharged because of
their offensive conduct that took place in the midst of concerted
activity. The analysis includes the factual situation, as well as
how the NLRB evaluated whether the employees should lose the
protection of the NLRA in each case, despite the otherwise
protected nature of their concerted conduct that related to terms
and conditions of employment, or involved mutual aid or
protection under § 7 of the Act.
A.

Hooters of Ontario

The Hooters location in Ontario, California held an annual
bikini contest.47 This was an event that drew large numbers of
customers and provided publicity for the restaurants and the
participants.48 An NLRB ALJ found that the company violated
§ 8(a)(1) of the Act when it terminated employee Hanson for
engaging in protected concerted activity because she had
complained about working conditions, wages, and her belief that
the contest was rigged.49 The employee complained because both
the winner’s best friend and boyfriend judged the contest that the
winner arranged, competed in, and then won.50 The Vice
President for Human Resources asserted that Hanson was
discharged because she cursed at the winner, and when Hanson
denied the swearing, the V.P. added that the termination was for
negative Twitter posts.51 However, on cross-examination, the
V.P. stated that she did not rely on Hanson’s tweets as a basis for
termination.52 The ALJ found that Ms. Hanson did not in fact


47
Hooters of Ontario I, No. 31-CA-104872, slip op. at 8, 2014 WL 2086220
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges May 19, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-104872,
aff’d, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 2015 WL 5143098 (Sept. 1, 2015).
48
Id. at 10.
49
Id. at 28, 40.
50
Id. at 12–13.
51
Id. at 27.
52
Id. at 27 n.7. Another discharged coworker who cursed at the winner in front
of customers and coworkers filed a charge with the Board, but her charge was
dismissed and she did not appeal. Id. at 15–16.
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swear at the winner as the employer alleged, and that Hanson’s
conduct was indeed protected so that she was entitled to
reinstatement and backpay.53
The ALJ in Hooters addressed a number of Hooters’ rules
that were problematic under the NLRA.54 First, the company’s
rule prohibiting discussing tips explicitly restricted § 7 protected
activity—namely, discussing wages—and was unlawfully
overbroad in that it prohibited discussing the same with guests
who were nonemployees.55 Next, the company’s rule against
insubordination was unlawful because it prohibited all
disrespectful conduct towards others, including managers, fellow
employees, and guests, and imposed an inherently subjective
standard.56 Such a rule would have a chilling effect upon the
exercise of § 7 rights and had no limitations placed upon its
broad terms.57 Further, the disrespect to guests prohibition was
“unlawfully overbroad and unqualified,” as was the ban on
profanity or negative comments or actions, and “no examples or
clarifications [were] provided.”58 In addition, the nondisclosure
rule regarding sensitive company materials was unlawfully
overbroad because employees could reasonably conclude that it
prohibited discussing wages and other employment terms and
conditions with nonemployees, including union representatives.59
Hooters’ rule regarding conduct that the company reasonably
believes a threat to its smooth operation, goodwill or profitability
was overbroad because employees would reasonably construe it
to inhibit protected activity under § 7.60 The employer’s rule
regarding off-duty conduct was unlawfully overbroad for similar
reasons in that it could reasonably be construed to prohibit
discussion of wages and working conditions with coworkers or
others.61
The company’s rule against discussing company
business or legal affairs outside of the company failed to comply
with the NLRA as well, because it would interfere with employee

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id. at 27–28, 42, 44.
Id. at 34–39.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 38.
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rights to discuss terms and conditions of employment.62 The
company’s rule against posting information about the company
on social networking sites was also illegal because of its impact
on protected § 7 activity, as was Hooters’ ban on disrespecting
the company, employees, customers, partners, and competitors,
posting offensive language or pictures that can be viewed by
coworkers or clients, and posting any information under any
circumstances about a coworker or customer.63 The ALJ was
careful to note that no mention was made of permitting conduct
protected by § 7 as a limitation on these rules.64 Last, the
company’s rules regarding confidential information and
nondisclosure were broadly written and clearly prohibited
discussion of matters protected by § 7, and thus were unlawful.65
The ALJ required Hooters to revise many of its rules that unduly
restricted § 7 rights, including one that required employees to
waive their right to class or collective action in all forums,
judicial or arbitral.66
B.

Plaza Auto Center

In Plaza Auto Center, Inc.,67 Nick Aguirre, a former car
salesman, complained about the lack of bathroom facilities at a
tent sale, and questioned the employer’s compensation policy for

62

Id.
Id.
64
Id. at 38–39.
65
Id. at 40.
66
Id. at 41–42. This mandatory individual arbitration rule violated the Board’s
holding in D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274 (Jan. 3, 2012),
enforced in part, rev’d in part sub nom. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th
Cir. 2013), which, because he was bound by Board precedent, the ALJ found
controlling. Hooters of Ontario I, slip op. at 30–31. After the filing of exceptions by
Hooters, a three-member panel of the NLRB agreed with the ALJ that Hooters’
mandatory arbitration agreement “would reasonably be read by employees to
prohibit the filing of [ULP] charges with the Board” and thus the policy violated the
Act. See Hooters of Ontario II, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 2015 WL 5143098, at *1–2 (Sept.
1, 2015) (first citing Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 5465454,
at *25 n.98 (Oct. 28, 2014); then citing D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012 WL 36274, at *2); see
also Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, The NLRB v. The Courts:
Showdown over the Right to Collective Action in Workplace Disputes, 52 AM. BUS.
L.J. 75, 76–77 (2015) (analyzing the Board’s rule that § 7 ensures an employee’s
right to proceed collectively and mandatory arbitration agreements that cut off all
collective action violate the NLRA).
67
Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc. (Plaza Auto III), 360 N.L.R.B. No. 117, 2014 WL
2213747 (May 28, 2014).
63
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sales.68 He challenged commission calculations, asserting that
the company failed to follow its policies regarding flat list
commissions in a sale he made from the “flat list,” with the result
that he was underpaid for that sale.69 In addition, Aguirre
complained about the employer deducting a portion of the cost of
repair for a damaged vehicle equally from all salesmen in the
event that no one admitted to causing the damage.70 Further,
Aguirre contacted the state wage and hour agency and advised
other employees that they were entitled to the minimum wage as
a draw against commissions.71 Thereafter, one of the sales
managers called a meeting attended by the owner, Tony Plaza, as
well as another manager and Aguirre.72 At the meeting, Plaza
told Aguirre that he was talking negatively and asking too many
questions, that he should not be complaining about pay, and that
if he did not trust them, he did not need to work there.73 Aguirre
got upset and called Plaza a “fucking crook,” and an “asshole,”
and he further informed the owner that he was “stupid, nobody
liked him, and everyone talked about him behind his back.”74
Aguirre then stood up, pushed his chair aside, and warned Mr.
Plaza that if he fired him, he would regret it; whereupon Plaza
did fire him.75
Clearly, Aguirre’s conduct involved NLRA protected activity
in that he acted in concert regarding his own as well as others’
wages and working conditions.76 As the Board noted, Aguirre
“spoke with his fellow employees and managers about . . . breaks,
restroom facilities, and compensation.”77 In Plaza Auto,78 the
NLRB reconsidered its earlier decision upon remand from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which
directed the Board to reweigh the NLRB’s four-factor Atlantic

68

Id. at *1.
Id.
70
Id. at *2.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
See id. at *20 (Member Johnson, dissenting) (stating, “[i]t is undisputed that
Aguirre was engaged in protected concerted activity when voicing his complaints”).
77
Id. at *1 (majority opinion).
78
Id.
69
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Steel test.79 While the appellate court agreed with the Board that
three of the four factors weighed in favor of protecting the
employee’s conduct, the court required the Board to reassess the
fourth “nature of the outburst” factor to see if this should result
in Aguirre’s conduct losing the Act’s protection.80 The Ninth
Circuit noted that the ALJ had found that despite the protected
activity involved, the salesman’s obscene remarks and personal
attacks on the owner resulted in a loss of the protection of the
Act.81 In contrast to the ALJ’s finding, the Board initially found
that the conduct was not so severe as to result in the loss of the
Act’s protection.82 Upon remand to the NLRB from the appellate
court, the Board once again found that the employer violated the
Act when it discharged the salesman and that the employee did
not lose the protection of the Act because of his outburst.83
Following the appellate court’s direction to reweigh the
“nature of the outburst” factor, the Board held that the
employee’s outburst “solely involved obscene and denigrating
remarks that constituted insubordination” and did not involve
“menacing, physically aggressive, or belligerent conduct.”84 In
addition, the Board found that the other three factors
“compellingly favor[ed] Aguirre’s retaining protection.”85 The
Board looked to the precedent of Kiewit Power Constructors Co. v.
NLRB,86 a case involving employee language to a supervisor that
warned of unfavorable outcomes for the employer if it disciplined
or discharged employees for their conduct.87 As noted in Plaza
Auto, the Kiewit employees’ statements were deemed not
physically threatening, and the D.C. Circuit enforced the Board’s
Moreover, the Board, invoking Kiewit,
Kiewit decision.88

79
See Green, supra note 38, at 1639 (discussing the NLRB’s 2014 Plaza Auto
decision and its interpretation of Atlantic Steel). The four factors from Atlantic Steel
Co. are: “(1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion;
(3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any
way, provoked by an employer’s [ULP].” 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979).
80
Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB (Plaza Auto II), 664 F.3d 286, 296 (9th Cir.
2011).
81
Id. at 291.
82
Id.; see Plaza Auto Ctr., Inc. (Plaza Auto I), 355 N.L.R.B. 493 (2010).
83
Plaza Auto III, 2014 WL 2213747, at *1.
84
Id. at *4.
85
Id.
86
Kiewit Power Constructors Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.3d 22 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
87
Id. at 24, 29 n.2.
88
See Plaza Auto III, 2014 WL 2213747, at *5–6.
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emphasized in Plaza Auto that employee statements must be
weighed objectively rather than subjectively.89 Thus, when
viewed objectively in the Board’s view, the fact that Aguirre rose
from his chair and pushed it aside was insufficient to find that
his conduct was menacing, physically aggressive, or belligerent.90
In addition, Plaza testified that he fired Aguirre for his verbal
abuse and would not have fired him otherwise.91
Even though the Board agreed with the Ninth Circuit that
the “nature of the outburst” factor from Atlantic Steel weighed
against protection of Aguirre’s conduct, finding his remarks
repeatedly profane and insulting in a face-to-face encounter, the
Board found that this did not require it to find that Aguirre lost
the Act’s protection.92 Rather, the Board found that the other
three factors weighed in favor of protection, and outweighed the
one factor that worked against Aguirre.93 Thus, the subject
matter surrounding the encounter weighed in favor of protected
conduct because it involved concerted complaints regarding
terms and conditions of employment, and also because it occurred
in a private meeting, as opposed to on a public work floor where
Also, the employer provoked
other workers could hear.94
Aguirre’s outburst by telling him he could quit if he did not like
the employer’s policies, and by implying that continuing to
engage in § 7 protected activity was incompatible with remaining
employed.95 Tony Plaza essentially refused to deal with Aguirre’s
complaints and indicated hostility to his conduct, conduct that
was protected by the Act.96 The timing of Aguirre’s outburst,
which occurred immediately after Plaza’s refusal to deal with the
substance of Aguirre’s complaints, and the implicit threat of
discharge if Aguirre continued to complain, all provoked the
outburst, which the Board concluded would not have occurred
absent the provocation.97
The Board provided a reasoned

89

Id.
Id. at *5.
91
Id. at *9.
92
Id. at *10.
93
Id. at *11.
94
Id.
95
Id. at *12.
96
Id.
97
Id. at *13. The Board also noted that Aguirre had not used such profanity
before, that his disciplinary record was spotless, and that he had not previously
engaged in violent or threatening behavior. Id.
90
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explanation, keeping with applicable law in light of assessing
Aguirre’s outburst for menace, aggressiveness, or belligerence by
The Board rejected the ALJ’s
an objective standard.98
belligerence finding, and ordered Aguirre’s reinstatement with
backpay and other benefits intact, expungement of any negative
information in his files regarding the discharge, and posting of
appropriate notices.99
Board Member Johnson dissented from the majority’s
decision, finding that Aguirre’s discharge was clearly justified
because his conduct lost the Act’s protection.100 Johnson stated
that protected concerted activity should not shield employees
who “curse, denigrate, and defy their managers” just because the
audience is small, there is provocation, and there are no “overt
physical threats.”101 Johnson focused on the Ninth Circuit’s
remand instructions, particularly with respect to the “nature of
the outburst” factor from Atlantic Steel.102 He viewed the
majority opinion as not giving “full effect” to the ALJ’s “factual
finding that Aguirre engaged in physically aggressive, menacing,
or belligerent behavior.”103 Johnson rejected the majority’s
reweighing of the other three factors that favored protection
against the one that did not.104 He objected to the majority’s
presumption that profanity is a reality of industrial life, finding
that, in contrast to a “Scorsese film,”105 an expectation of civility
at work is both reasonable and necessary.106 Johnson drew
distinctions based upon the cultural context of the business,
including the size of the enterprise and the values of the owners,
as well as what was accepted behavior at the particular
Johnson would not excuse a “profane and
workplace.107

98

Id. at *15–16.
Id. at *16.
100
Id. at *19 (Member Johnson, dissenting).
101
Id.
102
Id. at *20 (citing Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979)).
103
Id. at *21.
104
Id. at *22.
105
Id. at *23 & n.16 (referencing the film “The Wolf of Wall Street,” which was
reported to set a record high with 560 uses of the “f-word” in a film).
106
Id. at *23.
107
Id. This last factor seems particularly important in that an employer can
hardly complain about an employee using the same language that it uses, unless of
course such language would undermine the employer’s ability to supervise and
discipline. Still, one cannot help but think that what is good for the employee might
99
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demeaning personal attack on Plaza” simply because it took place
in a private room away from the main area or shop floor.108 He
then noted that employers have a duty based upon other
employment laws to monitor profanity that may “be viewed as
harassing, bullying, creating a hostile work environment, or a
warning sign of workplace violence.”109 Johnson warned that
“[t]he Board is not an ‘überagency’ authorized to ignore those
laws in its efforts to protect . . . § 7 rights.”110 Johnson viewed the
Board’s protection of misconduct as working against “ ‘industrial
peace’ and labor relations stability,” both goals of the NLRA.111
Johnson would have preferred that Aguirre continue to pursue
redress on the wage issue through government agencies rather
than launching into “a profane, personally abusive rant.”112
It is interesting that neither the majority nor the dissenting
opinion in Plaza Auto noted that there were three members of
management versus one employee, Aguirre, in the small room
where the disciplinary meeting, Aguirre’s outburst, and his
discharge took place. Based upon numbers alone, management
certainly had more physical power than one lone employee, and
the facts indicate that when Aguirre stood up and pushed his
chair away to get out of the room, two managers also stood up.113
Historically, the Board has long recognized the importance of an
employee being able to request a union representative to
accompany the employee on an investigatory interview that
reasonably could lead to discipline, but, in Plaza Auto, there was
neither a union present nor such a request.114

be good for the employer as well, especially under a statute such as the NLRA that
was intended to equalize bargaining power between employers and employees.
108
Id. at *24.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at *8 n.6 (majority opinion).
114
The right to request a union representative in this context is often referred to
as a “Weingarten right.” In NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., the Supreme Court upheld
the NLRB’s decision that, based upon § 7 of the NLRA, an employee has the right to
request that a union representative be present at an investigatory interview that the
employee reasonably fears might lead to discipline. 420 U.S. 251, 267–68 (1975); see
also Christine Neylon O’Brien, The NLRB Waffling on Weingarten Rights, 37 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 111, 114 (2005) (detailing the NLRB’s changing position on Weingarten
rights in the non-union context).
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Starbucks

In Starbucks Corp.,115 the NLRB reconsidered a case
involving face-to-face profanity upon remand from the Second
Circuit.116 When the case was previously decided, the Board,
applying the Atlantic Steel test, upheld an ALJ’s finding that the
employer violated § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by terminating
employee Joseph Agins for his union support.117 The district
manager of the store where Agins worked prohibited employees
from wearing union pins, and on the day prior to the incident in
question, the manager ordered employees to remove union pins
or be sent home.118 The next day, while off duty, Agins was
engaged in union activity when he swore at Yablon, an off-duty
assistant manager from another Starbucks store, in front of
customers at the Starbucks store where Agins worked.119 The
ALJ found that Yablon asked Agins about Agins’s father’s
support of the union, and that Agins then brought up Yablon’s
earlier derogatory remarks to Agins’s father, which had occurred
at an event where Agins and his father were distributing union
promotional materials.120 Thereafter, the conversation grew into
an argument with both men speaking loudly and using
obscenities and vulgar hand gestures.121 Agins told Yablon: “You
can go fuck yourself, if you want to fuck me up, go ahead, I’m
here.”122 Friends of Agins calmed him down, and the assistant
manager in the store told Yablon to “leave it alone,” whereupon
Yablon “chuckled” and left the store.123 Agins did not swear at or
threaten the assistant store manager who was on duty; instead,
he listened and remained seated while being admonished after
the incident.124


115

Starbucks IV, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 2014 WL 2736112 (June 16, 2014).
Id. at *1; see generally NLRB v. Starbucks Corp. (Starbucks III), 679 F.3d 70
(2d Cir. 2012).
117
See Starbucks Corp. (Starbucks II), 355 N.L.R.B. 636 (2010); see also
Starbucks Corp. (Starbucks I), 354 N.L.R.B. 876 (2009).
118
Starbucks IV, 2014 WL 2736112, at *2.
119
Id. at *1–2.
120
Id. at *2 & n.6.
121
Id. at *2.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
116
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Agins had been involved in an incident six months earlier,
where he asked Tanya James, the same assistant manager who
intervened with Yablon, for help, but there was a delay, and
when she arrived to help, he said “about damn time” and angrily
put a blender in the sink; Agins then said “this is bullshit” and
told James to “do everything your damn self.”125 Agins was
suspended for several days over this misbehavior, and he
apologized upon his return.126 The employer testified that it
prepared a written warning that Agins would be terminated if he
repeated this behavior, but interestingly, the ALJ credited
Agins’s testimony that he never received the alleged written
warning.127
Agins was terminated several weeks after the latter incident
with Yablon, and the discharge memorandum indicated that he
was not eligible for rehire because he “was insubordinate and
threatened the store manager” and because he “strongly
support[ed] the IWW union.”128 The Board’s General Counsel
argued that Agins’s discharge was unlawful, applying analysis
from both Atlantic Steel and Wright Line.129 The Second Circuit
agreed with the Board’s findings of interference with protected
activity regarding, among other things: the employer prohibiting
employees discussing the union while off duty; rules preventing
talking about terms and conditions of employment; a
discriminatory prohibition regarding use of the bulletin board for
non-work items, including union materials; and discriminatory
work assignments.130 However, the court made clear that the
four-factor Atlantic Steel analysis was inappropriate in a case
where an employee outburst occurs in front of customers because
the employer has a legitimate concern to prevent such a public
outburst from happening.131 Rather, the court noted that the
Atlantic Steel test is geared to an outburst on the factory floor or
a back room.132 The first factor from Atlantic Steel is the place of
the outburst, but the concern in Atlantic Steel was whether other

125

Id. at *1.
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at *2.
129
Id. (first citing Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979); then citing Wright
Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980)).
130
See id. at *3 n.8.
131
See id. at *3.
132
See id.
126
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employees were present such that the outburst would impair
employer discipline, as well as whether the outburst occurred
during a grievance proceeding or contract negotiations.133 Upon
remand, the court instructed the Board to determine “what
standard should apply when an employee, ‘while discussing
employment issues, utters obscenities in the presence of
customers.’ ”134
The Board on remand in Starbucks accepted the Second
Circuit’s ruling regarding the inappropriateness of the Atlantic
Steel analysis to the instant case.135 The majority of the panel
then simply assumed that Agins lost the protection of the Act
when he engaged in the obscene outburst in front of customers,
but nonetheless managed to find protection for Agins in a Wright
Line analysis.136 Under Wright Line, the “direct, documentary
evidence of unlawful motivation” was provided by the antiunion
animus that appeared in the employer’s written record of the
discharge decision, where the reasons cited for firing Agins
concluded with the fact that he strongly supported the union.137
As the Board noted, the General Counsel must establish, “by a
preponderance of the evidence, that an employee’s union
activities were a motivating factor in the employer’s decision to
take adverse action against the employee.”138 The three elements
needed to prove an employer’s unlawful motive are: union
activity by the employee, the employer’s knowledge of such, and
antiunion animus.139 All of these elements were readily present
on the facts in the Starbucks case, and thus the General Counsel
met its burden.140
Once the General Counsel met its burden under the Wright
Line test, the burden then shifted to the employer to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the
same action absent Agins’s protected activities.141 The employer

133

See id.
Id. (quoting Starbucks III, 679 F.3d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 2012)).
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at *3–5. It is not all that common to see such blatant evidence of
antiunion animus in written documentation of an adverse employment decision, and
it was clear that this language was critical to the Board’s decision.
138
Id. at *3.
139
Id.
140
Id. at *4.
141
Id.
134
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alleged that Agins was discharged in accordance with the final
warning sent to him in May, and that the employer was following
valid rules in discharging him, but the Board found that the
record did not support that version of events.142 Rather, the
Board found that the employer treated other employees less
harshly, even when their misconduct was worse.143 The Board
noted that Agins’s misconduct was provoked by a supervisor who
engaged in the same profanity, and yet the supervisor was not
disciplined.144 Equally damning to the employer’s defense was its
incomplete evidence as to the source of the decision to discharge
Agins, as well as its “exaggerated version” of Agins’s conduct and
interpersonal issues, all of which the ALJ discredited.145 The
ALJ so noted, and the Board agreed, that the assertion of false
reasons for the employment action created an inference that the
real reason was unlawful.146 Moreover, the Board took into
account the fact that the ALJ credited Agins’s testimony that he
never received the final written warning after the May
incident.147 Finally, the Board emphasized that despite the
earlier May incident for which Agins was disciplined, six months
had passed, and the direct evidence of unlawful motivation in his
discharge record made it difficult to believe that Agins would
have been discharged even if he had not engaged in protected
activity.148 Thus, the Board ruled that even if it assumed Agins’s
November 21 actions—cursing at Yablon in public—exceeded the
Act’s protection, his discharge was unlawful under a Wright Line
analysis.149 In effect, the Board ordered his reinstatement with
backpay, the removal of adverse information in his employment
record, and notice posting to not commit ULPs in the future.150
Board Member Miscimarra concurred in the Starbucks
decision, agreeing that the record supported the finding that
Agins’s discharge violated the NLRA in accordance with the
Wright Line analysis.151 However, Miscimarra objected to the

142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *8 (Member Miscimarra, concurring).
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majority’s failure to create a standard for retail employees who
engage in misconduct in front of customers because, in his view,
that was what the Second Circuit requested of the Board when it
remanded the case.152 In Miscimarra’s view, the appellate court
specifically outlined the inappropriateness of the Atlantic Steel
test to the retail setting, where employers have a legitimate
concern that employee outbursts not contain obscenities in front
of customers.153 Miscimarra also expressed concern because the
court noted that Agins was off duty, but on the employer’s
premises, at the time of his outburst, and while the court
directed the Board to address this specific situation, the majority
failed to do so.154
Miscimarra recommended adopting the
standard that the Board used in its earlier Restaurant Horikawa
decision,155 which provides that “retail employees lose the Act’s
protection if their conduct causes disruption of or interference
with the business.”156 Further, Miscimarra would apply the rule
that retail employees who are off duty but inside the store, and
who engage in disruptive conduct in the presence of customers,
lose the protection of the Act.157 He noted that the Act does not
permit employees who are either on or off duty to occupy, disrupt
or interfere with normal operations.158 Miscimarra found that
Agins’s conduct met this standard and thus lost the Act’s
protection; he noted that the ALJ also found that Agins’s actions
were disruptive, and that the argument could have resulted in a
disruption of business.159
The Board’s decision in Starbucks was limited to its unique
facts—facts that weighed against the employer in light of its
confused managerial decision making, as well as the damning
direct evidence of antiunion animus in Agins’s discharge
paperwork. Thus, the majority opinion in Starbucks left some
questions remaining regarding the general standard that the


152

Id.
Id.
154
Id. at *9.
155
Id. at *9 (citing G.T.A. Enters., Inc. (Restaurant Horikawa), 260 N.L.R.B. 197
(1982)).
156
Id. at *9; see also Restaurant Horikawa, 260 N.L.R.B. at 198.
157
Starbucks IV, 2014 WL 2736112, at *10 (Member Miscimarra, concurring).
158
Id.
159
Id. at *10–11.
153
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Board will apply to profanity in the retail store context—as
opposed to on the shop floor—in the absence of direct evidence of
unlawful motivation.
D. Pacific Bell Telephone Company: A Case of Double Entendre
on Union Buttons
In Pacific Bell Telephone Co.,160 the Board considered a case
that arose in the context of negotiating a new collective
bargaining agreement (“CBA”).161 The prior CBA contained a
Branded Apparel Program (“BAP”) provision in the appendix for
dress code that included branded shirts for professional
appearance.162 During the bargaining, the parties agreed to
display initials for both the company and the union on the BAP
shirts, but mention of the latter was not included in the CBA
appendix.163 Upon expiration of the 2009-2012 CBA, the union
distributed buttons that said, among other things: “WTF,
Where’s The Fairness,” “FTW Fight To Win,” and “CUT the
CRAP! Not My Healthcare.”164 The technicians who wore and
refused to remove these dual-meaning union pins and stickers
were not dispatched into the field, and instead were sent home
without pay.165 The Board found that these buttons and stickers
were “not so vulgar and offensive as to cause employees wearing
them to lose the protection of the Act.”166 The fact that the
acronyms contained a nonprofane, nonoffensive interpretation on
the face of the buttons and stickers alleviated the concern that
they were inherently inflammatory.167 The Board also found that
the “CUT the CRAP! Not My Healthcare” slogan was neither so
vulgar nor so obscene as to lose the Act’s protection.168
The Board noted that § 7 encompasses the right of employees
to wear union insignia and buttons at work.169 The burden is on
the employer to establish special circumstances that would

160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

362 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 2015 WL 3492100 (June 2, 2015).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801–03 (1945)).
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outweigh this right and justify a restriction.170 Merely wearing a
uniform is insufficient justification, as is customer exposure to
the union insignia.171 The NLRB found that the employer did not
demonstrate special circumstances, that the union did not waive
its right to bargain about the issue of appearance, and that the
employer inconsistently enforced its BAP, having allowed many
non-BAP buttons, stickers, and caps that were both unionaffiliated and not.172 In addition, the employer’s ban included all
union insignia, not just those that it deemed offensive as overtly
vulgar or obscene.173
It is interesting to compare the Pacific Bell case with a few
other recent Board and court rulings in cases also involving pins
and insignia. In another such case involving pins and insignia
but not profanity, the NLRB found that car dealer Boch Honda
violated the Act with its overbroad social media policy, which
included, among other things, a prohibition on using the
employer’s logos in any manner, and its dress code, which banned
use of pins, insignias, and message clothing for employees in
contact with the public.174 The Board majority determined that
these policies interfered with employee engagement in protected
concerted activities, and noted that the dress code prohibition on
employees’ right to wear union insignia was overly broad and not
justified by special circumstances.175
In an earlier telephone company apparel case not involving
profanity, shirts donned in support of a union in its negotiations
with AT&T Connecticut read “Inmate #” on the front and
“Prisoner of AT$T” on the back.176 The D.C. Circuit ruled in favor
of AT&T, refusing to enforce the NLRB’s order that it was an
ULP for the company to insist that employees visiting customer

170

Id. (citing Komatsu Am. Corp., 342 N.L.R.B. 649, 650 (2004)).
Id. (first citing P.S.K. Supermarkets, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 34, 35 (2007); then
citing Meijer, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 50, 50 (1995); and then citing United Parcel Serv.,
312 N.L.R.B. 596, 596–98 (1993)).
172
Id. at *5.
173
Id. The employer’s ban included buttons saying “No on Prop 32,” a
controversial political position that the employer did not want customers assuming
it endorsed. Id. at *6. The Board, however, found that the wearing of such buttons
was also protected by § 7 of the NLRA. Id.
174
Boch Imps., Inc. (Boch Honda), 362 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 2015 WL 1956199, at
*1–2 (Apr. 30, 2015).
175
Id. at *3.
176
S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 2011 WL 1090112, at *1 (Mar.
24, 2011).
171
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homes or working in public remove the shirts or be suspended.177
The court discussed making a decision based upon common
sense, noting that customers could believe that the employees
were prisoners, and customers in Connecticut could be concerned
in light of a local triple murder resulting from a home invasion.178
The court looked to the “special circumstances” exception in
Republic Aviation before it stated: “The ultimate question for the
Board in any individual case is whether the employer has shown
a reasonable belief that the particular apparel may harm the
employer’s relationship with its customers or its public image.”179
Last, in its NLRB v. Starbucks Corp.180 decision, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the Board went too far
in invalidating Starbucks’ one-button limit for employees in light
of the company’s legitimate managerial interest in its public
image and the fact that it permitted one union button.181 Clearly,
appellate courts seem reluctant to adopt the Board’s broad stance
in support of § 7 protected expression when doing so comes at the
expense of the employer’s reputation or image. Nonetheless, the
Board and ALJs continue to adopt the view that employer
policies on logos and insignias must not be overly broad absent
special circumstances that justify the restriction on employees’
right to wear union insignia.182


177

S. New Eng. Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 793 F.3d 93, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Id. at 95.
179
Id. at 97; see Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801–03 (1945).
180
679 F.3d 70 (2012).
181
Id. at 78.
182
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 13-CA-114222, slip op. at 9–11, 2015 WL
3526139 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 4, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA114222 (finding Wal-Mart dress code while on duty was overly broad and not
justified by special circumstances in that it required such items as logos to be small
and not distracting). The policy provided: “Walmart logos of any size are permitted.
Other small, non-distracting logos or graphics on shirts, pants, skirts, hats, jackets
or coats are also permitted[.]” Id. at 1. The employer revised the policy in 2014 to
provide that small logos were to be “no larger than the size of your associate name
badge[.]” Id. at 3. The ALJ in Wal-Mart cited the Board’s Boch Honda decision in
support of his opinion. Id. at 7 (citing Boch Imps., Inc. (Boch Honda), 362 N.L.R.B.
No. 83, 2015 WL 1956199 (Apr. 30, 2015)).
178
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Cooper Tire

In Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.,183 the company had a
longstanding collective bargaining relationship with the union
that represented more than a thousand production and
maintenance workers at its Findlay facility.184 During a brief
period when a prior collective bargaining agreement had expired,
and after the company made its last, best, final offer, the union
members voted not to ratify the agreement, and the company
locked out the bargaining unit employees.185 The company
continued to operate with supervisors, managers, and
replacement workers, as the parties continued to bargain while
the locked-out employees maintained peaceful picket lines.186 On
the evening of a hog roast sponsored by the union at the union
hall adjacent to the picket line, a number of attendees joined the
picket line.187 Tempers flared, and the locked-out employees
exhibited profanity and vulgar gestures towards the “scabs” who
were taking their jobs, as evidenced on security video.188 When a
locked-out employee, Runion, denigrated a replacement worker’s
diet as consisting of Kentucky Fried Chicken and watermelon,
his remark led to his discharge in light of the company’s policy
against racial harassment.189
The union filed a grievance alleging that Runion’s discharge
was not for “just cause.”190 The arbitrator, however, upheld the
discharge in light of the employer’s racial harassment policy,
finding that the misconduct was serious, especially in the context
of the picket line where comments could escalate into violence.191
The NLRB refused to defer to the arbitration award, and issued a
complaint against Cooper Tire.192 The Board’s General Counsel

183
No. 08-CA-087155, 2015 WL 3544120 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 5, 2015),
available at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/08-CA-087155.
184
Id. at 2.
185
Id. at 2–3.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 3.
188
Id. at 3–5.
189
Id. at 6. The policy prohibited harassment based upon race including
unwelcome comments or conduct relating to race “which fails to respect the dignity
and feelings of any Cooper employee.” Id. The policy provided that “Cooper
employees found to be harassing others will be subject to disciplinary action, up to
and including discharge.” Id.
190
Id. at 6–7.
191
Id. at 7.
192
Id.
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raised the issue that the arbitrator did not consider whether the
conduct was protected under the NLRA and whether the award
was repugnant to the Act.193 The General Counsel noted that an
African-American employee who called his supervisor a “dumb
white hillbilly asshole” was merely suspended and not discharged
as Runion was, thus arguing that Runion’s punishment for a
racial remark was too severe.194
As the ALJ noted in Cooper Tire, picketing is protected by § 7
of the Act, and personal confrontation is a necessary part of
picketing to accomplish the union’s cause.195 Thus, the critical
question was whether Runion’s conduct exceeded the Act’s
protection.196
Runion’s comments were unaccompanied by
threats or acts of violence, and “did not tend to coerce or
intimidate employees in the exercise of their rights under the
Act, nor did they raise a reasonable likelihood of an imminent
physical confrontation.”197 This was so because even though they
were “racist, offensive, and reprehensible . . . they were not
violent in character, and they did not contain any overt or
implied threats to replacement workers or their property.”198 The
ALJ outlined Board precedent to support his findings,
illustrating examples of far worse “obscene, insulting[,] and
indecent” statements that involved sexual and racial slurs yet
remained protected by the Act.199
The Board distinguishes between conduct in the workplace
and that on the picket line, with more leeway afforded to conduct
in the latter context as it is outside the workplace and not on
working time.200 In addition, the ALJ in Cooper Tire noted that
the four-factor Atlantic Steel test was inappropriate since that
test applies to workplace conduct.201 The judge noted that the
Board reinforced this concept in Triple Play, where it ruled that
the Atlantic Steel test applies to balancing employee rights

193

Id. at 8.
Id.
195
Id. at 10.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 11 (citing Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984),
enforced sub nom. Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc. v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir.
1985)).
198
Id. at 12.
199
Id. at 12–13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
200
Id. at 14.
201
Id. at 14–15 & n.15 (citing Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979)).
194
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against the employer’s interest in maintaining control over the
workplace, a concern that generally arises in cases involving
face-to-face communications, as opposed to Facebook
comments.202 The ALJ in Cooper Tire found that under the
relevant precedent regarding picket line activity, Runion’s
conduct was protected so that his discharge violated the Act, and
deferral to the arbitration award was inappropriate.203 The ALJ
reasoned that the arbitrator did not consider Runion’s rights
under the NLRA, nor did he apply well-established Board
precedent, instead applying a standard providing for less leeway
on a picket line than in the workplace, which was “palpably
wrong” and thus clearly repugnant to the Act.204 The arbitrator’s
limited consideration of the cause for discharge to the context of
the collective bargaining agreement and the company’s policy
against racial harassment did not encompass whether the cause
was “imposed for a reason that is prohibited by the Act,” such as
engaging in protected concerted activity.205 The fact that Runion
made two racist statements was insufficient to remove his
picketing activity from the protection of the Act, and the ALJ
ordered him reinstated with backpay.206
III. SOCIAL MEDIA CASES
The next four cases involved employer actions regarding
employee communications on social media, as well as employer
rules and discipline that unduly infringed upon employees’ § 7
rights.
A.

Triple Play Sports Bar and Grille

In Triple Play,207 the Board ruled that the employer violated
the NLRA by discharging two employees for their protected
concerted activity on Facebook.208 The social media exchange
involved the employees’ complaints regarding their boss—the

202
Id. at 15 (citing Three D, LLC (Triple Play), 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 2014 WL
4182705, at *4 (Aug. 22, 2014)).
203
Id. at 16.
204
Id. at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
205
Id. at 18–19 (quoting Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 644, 647 (2007)).
206
Id. at 19.
207
Three D, LLC (Triple Play), 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 2014 WL 4182705 (Aug. 22,
2014), aff’d sub nom. Three D, LLC v. NLRB, 629 F. App’x 33 (2d Cir. 2015).
208
Id. at *1.
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company’s co-owner—and his incorrect handling of payroll, which
included making inaccurate tax deductions such that employees
owed money on their taxes.209 The Board found that the
employer violated the NLRA by threatening legal action against
employees for engaging in protected activity on social media and
by maintaining its overly restrictive “Internet/Blogging” policy.210
The Facebook communication of the employees was clearly
concerted and fell under the “mutual aid or protection” prong of
§ 7 of the Act.211 Thus, the Board limited its inquiry to whether
the activity lost the protection of the Act in light of the
employer’s legitimate interests.212
The employees communicated on Facebook between
themselves and with customers, complaining that because the
owners of Triple Play were unable to do the tax paperwork
correctly, the employees owed money; a complaint they expressed
by posting exclamations such as “Wtf!!!!” and “I FUCKING OWE
MONEY TOO!”213 One employee wrote that she was “calling the
labor board to look into it [because a co-owner of Triple Play] still
owes me about 2000 in paychecks.”214 The Facebook posts
described the Triple Play co-owner as “a shady little
man . . . [who probably] pocketed it all from all our paychecks.”215
The two employees involved in the Facebook exchange were
discharged, and one was told “she was not loyal enough” to be
working for the company in light of her Facebook comment.216
The second employee was terminated after interrogation
regarding his Facebook “Like” selection with respect to the
employees’ online discussion because he “liked the disparaging
He was told that company
and defamatory comments.”217
lawyers advised termination because the Facebook conversation
was defamatory and that he would be hearing from these
lawyers, but the employer and its lawyers did not pursue the
matter.218

209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218

Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
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The employer argued that the terminated employees’
Facebook activity lost the protection of the Act because they
adopted defamatory and disparaging comments on a public forum
that was accessible to employees and customers and damaged the
company’s public image.219 The NLRB found that the four-part
test announced in Atlantic Steel was “not well suited to address
issues that arise in cases like this one involving employees’ offduty, offsite use of social media to communicate with other
employees or with third parties.”220 This was true because
Atlantic Steel’s four-part analysis begins with the place of
discussion, which typically involves face-to-face communication
in the workplace between an employee and a supervisor or
manager.221 The Board found that the “place of discussion” factor
from Atlantic Steel was clearly inapplicable to the facts of the
social media discussion in Triple Play because that discussion did
not involve confrontation with a manager or supervisor in the
workplace.222 The NLRB noted that it has not applied Atlantic
Steel to communications by employees with third parties.223
Instead, the Board tested the social media conduct under its
rulings in Jefferson Standard and Linn, and found that the
comments were protected and the discharges unlawful under the
Wright Line analysis.224
The Board assessed employee Sanzone’s comment—“I owe
too. Such an asshole.”—as well as employee Spinella’s indication
that he “liked” employee LaFrance’s update—“Maybe someone
should do the owners of Triple Play a favor and buy it from them.
They can’t even do the tax paperwork correctly!!! Now I OWE
money . . . Wtf!!!!”—as protected, and refused to include
comments posted by others in the Facebook exchange.225 These
comments were qualitatively different in the Board’s view from

219

Id. at *4.
Id.
221
Id. at *4–5.
222
Id. at *4–5 & n.14 (citing Starbucks I, 354 N.L.R.B. 876, 877–78 (2009)
(noting that the Board applied the Atlantic Steel test to confrontation between
manager and employee in the workplace)).
223
Id. at *4.
224
Id. (citing NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers
(Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 471–72 (1953); Linn v. United Plant Guard
Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 65–66 (1966); Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083,
1089 (1980)).
225
Id. at *6.
220
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the disparaging communications in Jefferson Standard.226 The
mention of a labor dispute as required for protection in Jefferson
Standard was evidenced in Triple Play by the tax withholding
reference, and the comments were not directed at the general
public, nor were they so disloyal or disparaging that they lost the
protection of the Act, as did the communications in Jefferson
Standard.227 The purpose of the Facebook comments was mutual
support rather than disparagement of the employer’s products or
services.228 The comments were not defamatory because they
were not maliciously untrue; at most, they expressed a negative
personal opinion of the co-owner of Triple Play.229
The Board found that the discharge of the two employees for
their protected activity violated the NLRA, and that the
Internet/Blogging policy in the Triple Play handbook was
unlawfully overbroad, and thus also violated the Act, because
employees would reasonably construe the policy as prohibiting
protected activity.230 The policy restricted communication about
confidential and proprietary information as well as inappropriate
discussions about the company, management, and co-workers.231
The use of the word “inappropriate” was “sufficiently imprecise”
in the Board’s view, especially in light of the paucity of
This was
illustrative examples of prohibited conduct.232
particularly true in the context of the employer’s termination of
two employees for their protected activity on Facebook.233 The
Board found that the general savings clause that attempted to
alleviate any illegal impact of the policy did not save it from
being unlawful.234
Board Member Miscimarra joined in most of the panel’s
opinion in Triple Play but dissented in part regarding the
Miscimarra
Internet/Blogging policy, finding it lawful.235

226

Id.
Id. at *6–7.
228
Id. at *7.
229
Id.
230
Id. at *8.
231
Id.
232
Id. at *9 (citing First Transit, Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 1321108, at
*3 (Apr. 2, 2014)).
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id. at *11 & n.3 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part) (noting he “would
reexamine this standard in an appropriate future case”).
227
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disagreed with the standard applied by the majority, particularly
the majority’s application of the first prong of the test in
Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia.236 That prong would find an
employer’s policy unlawful if employees would reasonably
construe the language to prohibit § 7 activity.237 He interpreted
Triple Play’s policy as being legitimately aimed at preventing the
revelation of proprietary information about the company.238 The
dissent also noted that the employer did not refer to the policy
when it discharged the employees in question, instead saying
that the “disloyal and defamatory” Facebook comments were the
basis for termination.239 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed the NLRB’s decision in a brief,
unpublished summary order.240
The most significant pronouncement the Board made in
Triple Play is that it would not apply the Atlantic Steel fourfactor test when evaluating whether employee concerted activity
on social media should retain the protection of the Act.241
Because the “place of discussion” factor in social media situations
is not analogous to a workplace confrontation with an employer,
the Board found that Sanzone’s use of a single expletive to
describe her manager on a social media website accessible to
other offsite, off-duty employees and customers should not give
rise to an Atlantic Steel analysis.242
B.

Bettie Page Clothing

The NLRB reconsidered and essentially affirmed a vacated
decision and order that the Board incorporated by reference in
Bettie Page Clothing.243 This action was necessary because of the

236
Id. at *11 (citing Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc. (Lutheran Heritage Vill.Livonia), 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 646–47 (2004)).
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Three D, LLC v. NLRB, 629 F. App’x 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2015). The NLRB argued
for publication of the Second Circuit’s decision in order to give the ruling
precedential authority in the area of employees’ online speech rights. See Steven
Trader, 2nd Circ. Order on Facebook ‘Likes’ Not Precedent, Bar Says, LAW 360, Oct.
26, 2015, http://www.law360.com/articles/718813/2nd-circ-order-on-facebook-likesnot-precedent-bar-says.
241
Triple Play, 2014 WL 4182705, at *4.
242
Id. at *5.
243
Design Tech. Grp., LLC (Bettie Page Clothing II), 361 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 2014
WL 5524147, at *1 (Oct. 31, 2014) (Chairman Pearce and Members Hirozawa and
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Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning, a decision
that, in holding challenged appointments to the NLRB invalid,
effectively undermined the authority of deciding members behind
the Board’s earlier decision in the case.244 The Bettie Page
Clothing case involved a clothing store in the Haight-Ashbury
district of San Francisco, California, where employees raised
safety and other concerns regarding working conditions to their
supervisor and the store owner, both in person and on Facebook,
and were terminated as a result.245 One terminated employee,
Vanessa Morris, referenced the California Worker’s Rights
Handbook on Facebook and, noting that her mother worked for a
law firm specializing in labor law, stated, “BOY will you be
surprised by all the crap that’s going on that’s in violation.”246
The ALJ in Bettie Page Clothing did not credit the
supervisor’s testimony that another one of the terminated
employees called her a “bitch.”247 The NLRB ruled that the
employees had engaged in protected concerted activity because
they had raised concerns regarding terms and conditions of
employment as well as mutual aid and protection, and thus were
entitled to reinstatement, backpay, and rescission of the
employer’s unlawful handbook rules.248 The company sought
review of the Board’s order; briefs have been filed and oral
arguments have been heard by the D.C. Circuit.249


Schiffer) (affirming the rationale of the vacated decision and order in Design Tech.
Grp., LLC (Bettie Page Clothing I), 359 N.L.R.B. No. 96, 2013 WL 1753561 (Apr. 19,
2013) (Chairman Pearce and Members Griffin and Block)). The appointments of
Members Griffin and Block were deemed invalid in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S.
Ct. 2550 (2014).
244
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2578.
245
Bettie Page Clothing I, 2013 WL 1753561, at *8–11.
246
Id. at *11.
247
Id. at *12.
248
Id. at *1–3.
249
See Design Tech. Grp. LLC Docket Activity, https://www.nlrb.gov/case/20CA-035511 (last visited June 6, 2016), for access to the company’s Petition for
Review by the D.C. Circuit (Nov. 7, 2014), as well as the final Brief for the NLRB
(May 8, 2015). The parties argued the appeal before the circuit court on January 1,
2016. Id.
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Pier Sixty

In Pier Sixty, LLC,250 the NLRB found in favor of a banquet
server who was discharged for engaging in § 7 protected activity
on Facebook, despite the profanities he expressed against his
immediate boss.251 The employees of a Manhattan catering
company began organizing a union in part because of the
degrading, disrespectful, and undignified treatment they
purportedly were receiving from their immediate managers.252
The employees brought complaints to the director of banquet
services.253 Later, just two days before the scheduled union
election, servers were harassed for talking together at a function;
they were told by the Assistant Director of Banquets, Robert
McSweeney, not to talk and to spread out.254 A server named
Perez took a break and used his iPhone to post the following on
his Facebook page: “Bob is such a NASTY MOTHER FUCKER
don’t know how to talk to people!!!!!! Fuck his mother and his
entire fucking family!!!! What a LOSER!!!! Vote YES for the
UNION!!!!!!!”255 The post remained up until the day after the
election.256 When management became aware of the post, they
asked McSweeney about the night of the posting, and he
maintained that nothing out of the ordinary had occurred.257
Perez was terminated for his comments.258 The ALJ found that
vulgarity and profanity were rampant at the employer’s
workplace among both employees and managers and that such
conduct did not result in discipline for others.259 The Board
agreed with the ALJ that Perez’s Facebook comments constituted
protected concerted activity because they related to mistreatment
of employees and sought to improve matters by supporting the


250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259

Pier Sixty II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688 (Mar. 31, 2015).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

FINAL_O’BRIEN

2016]

8/25/2016 12:17 PM

FROM SHOPTALK TO SOCIAL MEDIA

87

union in the upcoming election.260 The NLRB also agreed with
the ALJ that Perez’s comments were not so egregious that he lost
the protection of the Act.261
The Board in Pier Sixty evaluated the posting under the
totality of the circumstances and considered the following factors
in the record: (1) evidence of antiunion animus on the employer’s
part; (2) whether the employer provoked Perez; (3) whether the
conduct was impulsive or deliberate; (4) the location, subject
matter, and nature of the post; (5) whether the employer
considered the language offensive; (6) whether it had a rule
against such language; and (7) whether the discipline imposed
was equivalent to that imposed on others for like conduct.262 The
Board noted that the employer did show hostility towards union
activity as evidenced by ULPs in the period before the election,
noting in particular the disparate enforcement of the employer’s
“no talk” rule.263 The Board’s assessment of the factors supported
its finding that Perez was provoked; his postings were an
impulsive reaction to McSweeney’s commands and the stress
created by months of protesting disrespectful treatment of
servers.264 In addition, the Board noted that the employer
tolerated profane language, which was widespread at the
catering company, and that Perez’s reference to McSweeney’s
family was designed merely to intensify the insult, just as other
managers had done to employees.265 The location and subject
matter of the posting weighed in favor of retaining protection of
the Act since Perez was standing alone outside on break and was
not disrupting the work environment or customers, and his
comments only referenced previous complaints and encouraged
union support.266
While the employer had a policy regarding “Other Forms of
Harassment,” which it cited in its discharge of Perez, the policy
did not reference use of vulgar or offensive language in general;
rather, the policy addressed such language when directed at
protected classifications or statuses, none of which applied to

260
261
262
263
264
265
266

Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Perez’s comments about McSweeney.267 Further, the employer
had issued five written warnings to other employees for use of
obscene language since 2005, yet no discharges resulted, even in
cases where the employee was also insubordinate to a supervisor,
which the Board did not find occurred in Perez’s case.268 Thus,
the discharge of Perez exceeded the discipline meted out to
others, and the employer violated § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.269
Board Member Johnson dissented in part in Pier Sixty,
finding that Perez’s Facebook comments were both vulgar and
obscene, that they lost the Act’s protection, and that his
discharge was not an ULP.270 He agreed with the ALJ that the
“no talk” rule was disparately enforced, violating § 8(a)(1).271
However, Johnson determined that under the “totality of the
circumstances,” the employer was entitled to discipline Perez for
his “offensive online rant, which was fraught with insulting and
obscene vulgarities directed toward his manager and his
manager’s mother and family,” and which Johnson categorized as
“outrageous, individualized griping” that was “blatantly uncivil
and opprobrious behavior.”272 Johnson noted that the posting
was in fact publicly available.273 Applying the totality of the
circumstances analysis, Johnson found that the comments were
not made impulsively, but rather deliberately; that they were left
up for three days so that they could reach a broader audience of
nonemployee friends; and that they contained an obscene,
personal, and vicious attack on McSweeney and his family that
was “qualitatively different” from other obscenity that the
employer tolerated in the workplace.274 The dissent criticized the
Board panel’s analysis of the totality of the circumstances as “an
Atlantic Steel test on steroids that is even more susceptible to
manipulation based upon ‘agency whim’ than the 4-factor
Atlantic Steel test.”275 Johnson found that Perez’s posting
contained “a level of animus and aggression” toward McSweeney

267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275

Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id. (Member Johnson, dissenting in part).
Id. at *5 & n.2.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5 & n.3.
Id. at *5.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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that exceeded other statements that were tolerated.276 He saw no
merit in allowing employees to post statements that “cause
irreparable damage to working relationships” simply because the
behavior “happens to overlap with protected activity.”277
The panel opinion in Pier Sixty once again reflects the
Board’s departure from the Atlantic Steel test in social media
cases, with reference to its decision in Triple Play.278 The Board
adopts the ALJ’s alternative test in Pier Sixty, namely “the
totality of the circumstances.”279 The Board then incorporates a
checklist of relevant factors in assessing whether a social media
post that is otherwise protected by the Act should retain
protection.280 These factors include the presence of antiunion
animus and provocation, as well as whether the conduct at issue
was tolerated by the employer and whether the discipline was
disproportionate to that meted out to others who had not engaged
in protected concerted activity.281
D. Tinley Park Hotel & Convention Center
In yet another banquet server case, an NLRB ALJ found that
the employer violated the NLRA by terminating a server named
Santiago for her Facebook posts that violated the employer’s
handbook rule prohibiting disloyalty.282 The ALJ ruled that the
employer’s disloyalty rule was overbroad and thus unlawful, and
that three other rules were separate violations as they were
facially unlawful.283 The ALJ determined that Santiago’s actions
did not interfere with the work of others or the employer’s
operations.284
The employer’s handbook policies outlined
prohibited conduct such as “[d]isloyalty, including disparaging or
denigrating the food, beverages, or services of the company, its

276

Id.
Id.
278
Id. at *3 (majority opinion) (citing Three D, LLC (Triple Play), 361 N.L.R.B.
No. 31, 2014 WL 4182705, at *3 (Aug. 22, 2014)).
279
Id. (citing Richmond Dist. Neighborhood Ctr., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 2014 WL
5465462, at *2 & n.6 (Oct. 28, 2014) (examining the egregiousness of the conduct
under all the circumstances)).
280
Id. at *3.
281
Id.
282
Tinley Park Hotel & Convention Ctr., LLC, No. 13-CA-141609, slip op. at 1
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 16, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA-141609.
283
Id. at 1–2, 8–10.
284
Id. at 1.
277
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guests, associates, or supervisors by making or publishing false
or malicious statements.”285 Further, the employer prohibited
unauthorized use of a telephone or frequent, unnecessary use of a
telephone for personal business, or cell phone use during work
hours, except for breaks.286 The employer had employees sign a
standard operating procedure where they agreed to restrictions
on cell phone use.287
In Tinley Park Hotel, while on break during her shift,
Santiago used her cell phone and allowed others to use it to take
photos and post them on Facebook along with commentary,
including remarks that she was working like a slave, all of which
violated company policy.288 Santiago denied such use when
interviewed by her supervisors because she was fearful of losing
her job.289 Nonetheless, the ALJ ruled that the hotel and
convention center operator ran afoul of the NLRA when it fired
Santiago for violating company policy and damaging the
reputation of the business; the ALJ also ruled that the employer
had unlawfully maintained three other rules that unduly
restricted protected concerted activity.290 The ALJ noted that “an
employer does not escape liability for an unlawful discharge
because it asserts other, lawful reasons for the same disciplinary
action.”291 The employer’s assertion that it discharged Santiago
for violating its lawful cell phone rule did not obviate the fact
that she was also discharged for violating an unlawful rule—
namely, violating the employer’s disloyalty rule by posting photos
with derogatory comments that depicted the company in an
unfavorable light.292 Limited exceptions were filed to the ALJ’s
decision by the General Counsel’s office, exceptions seeking


285

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
287
Id.
288
Id. at 3–5.
289
Id. at 5.
290
See id. at 8–10; Jeff Zalesin, Hotel Worker Wrongly Fired over Posting Selfies,
NLRB Says, LAW 360, June 17, 2015, http://www.law360.com/articles/669067/hotelworker-wrongly-fired-over-posting-selfies-nlrb-says.
291
Tinley Park, slip op. at 7 (citing A.T. & S.F. Mem’l Hosps., Inc., 234 N.L.R.B.
436, 436 (1978)).
292
Id.
286
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reimbursement for the complainant’s work search expenses and
requiring the employer to notify employees of rescinded unlawful
rules in accordance with the Board’s decision in Purple
Communications, Inc.293
IV. PROFANITY ON UNION MATERIALS ON BREAKROOM WALL—
OH WHAT A TANGLED WEB HE WEAVES . . .
The final case in the top ten involves employee dishonesty in
response to an employer investigation prompted by employee
complaints regarding sexual harassment that related to profane
words and drawings.
In Fresenius USA Manufacturing, Inc.,294 decided in 2015,
the NLRB ruled that employee Grosso, who lied at an
investigation
about
scribbling
“vulgar,
offensive,
and . . . arguably threatening statements” on union materials
relating to a decertification election, had initially engaged in
protected activity, but his employer was justified in discharging
him in light of his subsequent dishonesty.295 The Board found
that the company investigation was a good faith response to
complaints from female employees about the comments.296 The
Board had issued a 2012 decision in the case that found that
Grosso’s discharge violated the Act, but the appointments of two
of the three deciding Board members were later deemed invalid
in NLRB v. Noel Canning,297 thus requiring the Board to review
de novo the ALJ’s decision, the record, exceptions, and briefs.298
Interestingly, prior to the Board’s 2012 decision, an ALJ found
that the employer had not violated the NLRA by discharging
Grosso.299

293
See General Counsel’s Limited Exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge’s
Decision and Arguments in Support of the Exceptions at 1–2, Tinley Park Hotel &
Convention Ctr., LLC, No. 13-CA-141609 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 16, 2015)
(citing Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 2014 WL 4764786, at *6 (Sept.
24, 2014)), available at https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA-141609.
294
362 N.L.R.B. No. 130 (Fresenius II), 2015 WL 3932160 (June 24, 2015).
295
Id. at *1.
296
Id.
297
134 S. Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014).
298
Fresenius II, 2015 WL 3932160, at *1.
299
See Fresenius USA Mfg., Inc. (Fresenius I), 358 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 2012 WL
4165822, at *34 (Sept. 19, 2012) (incorporating the ALJ’s decision where ALJ found
only one ULP occurred, namely, the employer instructing employee Grosso not to
discuss the investigation with other employees).
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On the facts as outlined in the Board’s 2012 decision, Grosso,
a union supporter, was concerned about an upcoming NLRB
election where he feared that the union would be voted out.300
Grosso feared this election result because, after the union had
won an earlier election to represent two bargaining units of
drivers and warehouse workers at Fresenius’s Chester, New York
manufacturing facility, the parties were unsuccessful in
negotiating a collective bargaining agreement.301 Grosso wrote
the following statements on union newsletters in the employee
breakroom: “Dear Pussies, Please Read!” “Hey cat food lovers,
how’s your income doing?” and “Warehouse workers, RIP.”302
When several female warehouse workers complained to
management, one noted that she recognized the handwriting and
produced driver logs for comparison.303 Based upon this evidence,
the Vice President and a senior director interviewed Grosso, who
denied writing the remarks.304 The next day Grosso mistakenly
dialed the Vice President of the company; he thought he had
dialed a union representative.305
During the call, Grosso
admitted writing the remarks on the newsletters, and the Vice
President identified himself and ordered Grosso in to work where
he suspended him.306 He admonished Grosso not to discuss the
investigation with others.307 The human resources manager
decided to discharge Grosso after reviewing the information,
including the written complaints, basing the termination decision
upon Grosso’s comments on the newsletters as well as his
dishonesty.308
In the trial before the ALJ, Grosso attempted to justify his
comments as indicating that the warehouse workers were
“spineless,” that they needed to “man up,” and that the “RIP”
referred to the fact that they were headed towards loss of their

300

Id. at *1.
Id. Fresenius is a manufacturer and distributor of disposable items for
dialysis. Id.
302
Id.
303
Id.
304
Id. at *2. There was no mention of Grosso requesting the assistance of a
union representative at this interview, and in both of its decisions the Board found
that the interview was properly conducted by the employer. Id. at *4; Fresenius II,
362 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 2015 WL 3932160, at *2 (June 24, 2015).
305
Fresenius I, 2012 WL 4165822, at *2.
306
Id.
307
Id.
308
Id.
301
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The judge noted that sanctions for profanity at
souls.309
Fresenius were usually minor reprimands.310 Nonetheless, under
the Atlantic Steel analysis, the ALJ found that Grosso lost the
protection of the Act because of the location and nature of his
comments and the lack of employer provocation.311 The 2012
Board, however, found that Grosso did not lose the protection of
the Act because the location, subject matter, and nature of his
comments favored continued protection even though the
provocation factor was “neutral.”312 In its 2012 decision, the
NLRB found that the ALJ had conflated the location of the
comments—the breakroom—with their nature—their anonymity
and threatening quality—and had thus incorrectly found that the
location and manner weighed against retaining the Act’s
protection.313
In contrast to the ALJ’s opinion, the 2012 Board found that
the subject matter of the comments was an exercise of § 7 rights;
that the nature of the outburst was impulsive; and that, while
the outburst was vulgar and could be deemed “demeaning to
women,” it nonetheless was not so egregious when evaluated in
the context of a workplace where profanity was common and not
subject to heavy sanctions.314 Similarly, the 2012 Board decision
found the “RIP” comment to contain ambiguity such that, in
context, it was not so threatening as to lose protection.315 Even
though the comments were anonymous, the Board felt that
because they were not anonymous for long, as another employee
identified the handwriting and passed her insight on to
management, and because their author had no record of violence,
the comments were not all that disruptive and therefore
remained protected.316
Thus, even though there was no showing of provocation, the
2012 Board found that the balance of the Atlantic Steel factors
weighed in favor of protection for Grosso’s comments.317 In its
2012 Fresenius decision, the Board looked at the totality of the

309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317

Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *6–7.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *8–9.
Id. at *9.
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circumstances, including, among others, the Atlantic Steel
factors.318 The decision also considered the fact that another
incident that did not involve protected activity but did involve
profanity—an employee pasted a “DON’T BE A DICK” sticker on
a piece of equipment that employees and customers could see—
had resulted in only minor discipline, all of which led to a
determination that Grosso’s comments should remain
protected.319 Board Member Hayes dissented in part to the 2012
decision, finding that Grosso’s comments should lose the Act’s
protection because remarks that coworkers reasonably deem
“harassing and sexually insulting” are disruptive to productivity,
and an employee who lies in an investigation relating to sexually
harassing remarks should not be protected by the NLRA simply
because he wants to “conceal [his] participation in union
activity.”320
The Board’s 2015 decision in the Fresenius case noted that
Grosso engaged in two acts of dishonesty: He denied authoring
the comments during the company’s investigation, and he sought
to conceal his identity after mistakenly confessing his
participation to the Vice President.321 The 2015 panel was
divided in its view of the protection afforded the handwritten
statements with Board Member Johnson finding that the
statements were not protected.322 However, in light of the
Board’s assumption that even if the comments were otherwise
protected they lost protection because of Grosso’s dishonesty, the
Board was united in its decision that Fresenius did not violate
the Act by discharging Grosso.323
The Board found that Fresenius had a legitimate interest in
investigating the harassing and threatening comments because
doing so related to the company’s ability to effectively operate its
business, to follow its antiharassment policy, and to comply with
federal and state antidiscrimination laws.324 Additionally, the
Board found that the employer carried out the investigation in a
lawful manner that was “reasonably tailored” and “consistent

318
319
320
321
322
323
324

Id. at *10.
Id.
Id. at *13 & n.1 (Member Hayes, dissenting in part).
Fresenius II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 2015 WL 3932160, at *1 (June 24, 2015).
Id. at *1 n.2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
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with the purpose of [the] investigation.”325 The employer did not
ask Grosso about his union activities or the union brochures,
focusing instead on the handwritten comments that were
purportedly vulgar, harassing, threatening, and offensive.326 In
the Board’s view, there was no evidence of antiunion animus on
the employer’s part, notwithstanding the fact that the employer
infringed § 7 rights when it admonished Grosso not to discuss the
investigation with others.327 The Board found that Fresenius met
its Wright Line burden of showing that it would have discharged
Grosso for dishonesty, even absent his protected activity, in light
of the employer’s past record of discharging two other employees
who were dishonest concerning a kickback investigation.328
V.

COMPARING AND ANALYZING NLRB CASES INVOLVING
PROFANITY PLUS DISHONESTY

One apparent inconsistency among the NLRB profanity
cases appears to be that the NLRB has protected employees who
engaged in dishonesty during investigations in some cases, but
not in others. In Cooper Tire,329 managers perceived that racial
harassment occurred on the picket line, and even though the
employee denied the conduct, the ALJ concluded that he was
responsible for the harassing remarks, and yet found that the
conduct remained protected activity and ordered the employee
reinstated.330
In contrast, the Board found that sexually
harassing conduct took the employee outside the Act’s protection
in Fresenius because the employee lied during the investigation
of materials defaced in the employee breakroom.331 The fact that
the offensive material in Fresenius was actually placed in the
workplace in the employee breakroom is important when
compared to the off-duty remarks of a locked-out employee on a
picket line that were made to replacement workers as in Cooper
Tire. This is because the context in Fresenius was the workplace
and work hours, whereas the context in Cooper Tire was outside

325

Id.
Id.
327
Id.
328
Id. at *3 (citing Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980)).
329
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. 08-CA-087155, 2015 WL 3544120 (N.L.R.B.
Div. of Judges June 5, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/08-CA-087155.
330
Id. at 20.
331
Fresenius II, 2015 WL 3932160, at *3.
326
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work and off duty. The ALJ noted in Cooper Tire that picketing
activity is evaluated by a different standard than workplace
activity, and deemed the employee’s conduct protected because it
was not violent or threatening, nor did it tend to coerce or
intimidate employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights.332
Clearly, in the midst of a lock out, employees on the picket line
are not expected to be as civil to those who are crossing the picket
line to work what they perceive to be their jobs as would be the
expectation of civility amongst co-workers who are at work.
Thus, the ALJ in Cooper Tire found that even though the
employee denied making the racist remarks while on the picket
line, his conduct remained protected by the Act.333 Another
ameliorating fact was that the locked-out employee’s comments
in Cooper Tire were not considered to be all that profane or
offensive; rather, they involved cultural stereotypes regarding
diet.334 In Cooper Tire, it was critical that the arbitrator did not
understand that picket line activity, rather than activity in the
workplace itself, allows for more impulsive and profane conduct,
so that the arbitrator mistakenly held the locked-out employee to
a higher standard than if he was at work rather than a lower
standard as should have been the case.335 Thus, the ALJ noted
that the arbitration award was repugnant to the Act, and under
the well-established rules of labor law, the Board will not defer to
an arbitrator’s award in such a case.336
In contrast, the fact that the employee in Fresenius lied
during the employer’s investigation into workplace misconduct,
and then confessed to the conduct to a managerial employee in a
case of mistaken identity, showed that he was responsible for the
harassing material, and was dishonest in the face of the
investigation, which was targeted at conduct that the employer
was legally bound to investigate.337 Thus, the vulgar, offensive,
and threatening handwritten statements in Fresenius were not
protected activity even though the employee aimed to support the
union with his comments and depictions on the union materials

332
333
334
335
336
337

2012).

Cooper Tire, slip op. at 15–16.
Id. at 5, 20.
Id. at 4–5, 20.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 16–20.
Fresenius I, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 2012 WL 4165822, at *1–2 (Sept. 19,
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in the breakroom.338 In addition, the subject matter in Fresenius
involved sexual harassment where employees complained to
management about material that was in the employee
breakroom. The Board strengthened its stance on complaining
about sexual harassment to co-workers as amounting to
concerted activity for purposes of mutual aid or protection under
§ 7 when it specifically overturned its Holling Press, Inc. decision
in Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, Inc.339 In Holling Press,
the NLRB had refused to find that conduct of an employee
seeking help in pursuing a sexual harassment claim constituted
concerted activity within the meaning of § 7 of the Act.340 In
Fresh & Easy, the Board found that the conduct of an employee
who sought the assistance of others in documenting a sexually
harassing and profane comment/picture on a whiteboard in the
breakroom was engaged in protected concerted activity for
mutual aid or protection.341 When the Board overturned Holling
Press in Fresh & Easy, it highlighted the importance of
employers having the responsibility to investigate and remediate
instances of sexual harassment in the workplace, and thus placed
these investigations in a class where employers are obligated to
act.342 Notably, the location of the offensive material in both
Fresh & Easy and Fresenius was the employee breakroom.
In another of the top ten profanity cases, Bettie Page
Clothing,343 an employee lied to her supervisor. There, the
employee lied when she denied sending a letter to the
supervisor’s boss, and yet the conduct remained protected by the
NLRA because the employee merely feared admitting to her
supervisor that she had complained about her and the working
conditions in the letter, which the Board found was a clear
example of conduct protected by § 7.344 It is important that the
lie in Bettie Page was not aimed at covering up a violation of
other lawful employer rules regarding harassment as in

338

Id. at *4.
Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Mkt., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 12, 2014 WL
3919910, at *1 (Aug. 11, 2014).
340
343 N.L.R.B. 301, 301 (2004).
341
Fresh & Easy, 2014 WL 3919910, at *1–4.
342
Id. at *11.
343
Bettie Page Clothing II, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 2014 WL 5524147 (Oct. 31,
2014) (reaffirming the Board’s decision in Bettie Page Clothing I, 359 N.L.R.B. No.
96, 2013 WL 1753561 (Apr. 19, 2013)).
344
Bettie Page Clothing I, 2013 WL 1753561, at *1–2, *9.
339
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Fresenius. A similar situation arose in Tinley Park where the
ALJ found that the banquet server denied using her cell phone
and posting pictures and comments on Facebook during work
hours because she was afraid of losing her job.345 But again, her
conduct was deemed protected by the Act because her conduct
related to terms and conditions of employment, the employer’s
rules were overbroad, and the employee did not otherwise engage
in illegal behavior.346 Thus, there were clear distinctions on the
facts in these cases involving dishonesty. Where the dishonesty
involved investigation of an employee’s illegal conduct at the
workplace, it was not protected, but where the dishonesty did not
involve illegal conduct, it was protected. And clearly, employee
action that takes place in the workplace is held to a higher
standard of civility than conduct taking place outside the
workplace, especially conduct on a picket line.
VI. THE TAKEAWAY FROM THE TOP TEN NLRB PROFANITY CASES:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In each of the top ten cases, certain factors were critical to
the outcomes. The critical factors included: the location of the
misconduct; the presence of employer rules that violated the
NLRA because they were overbroad and unduly interfered with
concerted activity that was protected by § 7; provocation of
employee(s) brought on by employer ULPs; the employer’s
general tolerance of profanity in the workplace; the inequality of
treatment amongst employees who engaged in similar profanity
but who were not engaged in protected concerted activity, with
the latter receiving more favorable treatment; whether or not the
employee presented as violent or overly aggressive in the context
of the profane outburst; and whether or not there was an
employee complaint of harassment that legally required the
employer to investigate and remedy harassment.
The outcome in profanity cases involving employee
dishonesty in the context of an employer investigation depends
upon the particularized fact pattern in each case. It is more
likely that the employee will lose the protection of the NLRA if

345
Tinley Park Hotel & Convention Ctr., No. 13-CA-141609, slip op. at 5, 2015
WL 3759559 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 16, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13CA-141609.
346
Id. at 7, 10–11.
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the misconduct occurred in the workplace and involves illegal
conduct. Where an employer is legally obligated to conduct an
investigation in light of employee complaints of illegal workplace
harassment, there is no employer ULP as long as the
investigation is conducted appropriately, that is, within the
bounds of its purpose, and the discipline meted out is consistent
with other cases of dishonesty that did not involve the exercise of
§ 7 rights.
Remedies ordered in the top ten cases include: reinstatement
of the complainants with backpay; posting a notice to not commit
future ULPs; and requiring that the employer revise any illegal
rules. The critical factors in each case are briefly summarized in
the next section, and the lessons learned from the cases are
outlined with recommendations for employers and employees to
manage workplace and social media profanity within the basic
tenets and legal parameters of the NLRA.
A.

Face-to-Face Cases

In Hooters,347 the employer had many rules that violated § 8
(a)(1) of the Act, and the ALJ did not find that Hanson, the
employee in question, engaged in the profanity that took place at
an employer sponsored competition—profanity that the employer
asserted as the basis for her termination.348 Thus, Hanson was
entitled to reinstatement with backpay, and the employer was
required to revise its many overbroad rules that interfered with
employees’ § 7 rights and post notices.349
In Plaza Auto,350 the Board looked to the four-factor Atlantic
Steel test, finding: (1) the place of discussion was in the
manager’s office, where other employees were unlikely to hear it,
and where it was unlikely to result in disruption; (2) the subject
matter was protected because it involved terms and conditions of
employment, including compensation; and (3) the employee was
provoked by the employer’s ULPs, including the remark that
implied that if the employee did not trust them, he did not need

347
Hooters of Ontario I, No. 31-CA-104872, 2014 WL 2086220 (N.L.R.B. Div. of
Judges May 19, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/31-CA-104872, aff’d, 363 N.L.R.B.
No. 2, 2015 WL 5143098 (Sept. 1, 2015).
348
Id. at 15, 27–28.
349
Id. at 42–43.
350
Plaza Auto III, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 117, 2014 WL 2213747 (May 28, 2014).
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to work there.351 Only the “nature of the outburst” factor from
Atlantic Steel weighed against employee Aguirre, which was
because his conduct involved obscene and denigrating remarks
that were insubordinate to the owner.352 Nonetheless, the Board
found that the other three factors that favored Aguirre retaining
the protection of the Act outweighed the one that did not, and so
Aguirre’s reinstatement was ordered with backpay, in addition to
posting a notice.353
In Starbucks,354 employee Agins’s profanity was provoked by
a manager who expressed antiunion animus.355 The manager
also engaged in profanity in the same interaction but was not
disciplined, unlike Agins who was discharged.356 The Board
looked to the employer’s written memorandum of discharge,
which indicated that the employee was not eligible for rehire for
three reasons.357 One of those reasons was that he supported the
union, which the Board found to be clear record evidence of
antiunion animus against Agins, thus preventing the employer
from meeting its burden of proving that the employee would have
been fired anyway under the Wright Line standard.358 Like
Hooters, Starbucks had rules that interfered with employees
engaging in protected concerted activity when off duty; these
were deemed to violate the NLRA, and the NLRB ordered the
rules revised.359 The Board ordered reinstatement of Agins with
backpay, removal of negative references in his employment file,
and posting a notice.360 The company’s clear statement that
Agins’s union support was a reason not to rehire him was, in all
likelihood, the most critical factor in this Board decision and
illustrates just how important it is that managers are aware of
what is an illegal reason for termination under the NLRA.361

351

Id. at *11–13.
Id. at *9.
353
Id. at *16.
354
Starbucks IV, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 2014 WL 2736112 (June 16, 2014).
355
Id. at *1–3.
356
Id. at *4.
357
Id.
358
Id.
359
Id. at *3 & n.8 (noting the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit enforced the Board’s findings about these ULPs).
360
Id. at *6.
361
Id. at *4.
352
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In Pacific Bell Telephone Co.,362 the union buttons that the
employer objected to employees wearing in front of customers
contained acronyms that could be read to infer profanity were it
not for the spelled-out reference to the full words, which were not
profane and were indicated right on the face of the pins.363 One
pin included a vulgar word but it simply was not that bad in the
Board’s view.364 The Board focused on the transparency of the
pins, the right to wear the pins unless there are special
circumstances, which was not established in the case at bar, and
that the employer ban on union insignia was overbroad.365 The
takeaway from this case is that an employer should be careful
not to presume that a potential double meaning of an acronym is
problematic if followed by an alternate innocent phrase.
Moreover, a “light” swear does not necessarily make a union
button something that can be prohibited absent a showing of
special circumstances by the employer, such as a business
necessity.
The employer should weigh such prohibitions
carefully, especially when it has bargained with a union and
agreed to the use of branded apparel that includes the use of a
union logo. In addition, employees and unions should avoid
exceeding the limited protection for profanity outlined in this
case.
In Cooper Tire,366 an ALJ weighed a locked-out employee’s
racially stereotypical comments and gestures targeting those
crossing a picket line with the employer’s policy against racial
harassment, and still found in favor of the employee because he
was treated more harshly than another employee who had called
his supervisor a racially-charged and vulgar name but was only
The judge determined that the conduct of
suspended.367
employee Runion was neither threatening nor violent, and noted
that the Atlantic Steel factors were inapposite because they apply
in the workplace and not on a picket line.368 Thus, the ALJ in
Cooper Tire ordered Runion reinstated with backpay.369 The

362

362 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 2015 WL 3492100 (June 2, 2015).
Id. at *2–3.
364
Id. at *3–4 (noting word “crap” was not all that bad).
365
Id. at *3–5.
366
No. 08-CA-087155, 2015 WL 3544120 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 5, 2015),
https://www.nlrb.gov/case/08-CA-087155.
367
Id. at 8.
368
Id. at 14–16.
369
Id. at 20–21.
363
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outcome in this case is particularly interesting when contrasted
with the NLRB’s 2015 decision in Fresenius370 because there, the
Board found that profane writing and drawings amounting to
sexual harassment on a bulletin board in a breakroom was not
protected in light of the employee’s dishonesty regarding the
ensuing investigation.371 In Cooper Tire, employee Runion, like
the Fresenius employee, denied his conduct, but here, the ALJ
ordered Runion reinstated even after determining from the
security video that Runion made the racially-charged statements
at issue.
The Cooper Tire decision is presently under appeal based
upon exceptions to the ALJ’s decision, but in the meantime, it is
important to note what the key differences are in these cases.372
Cooper Tire involved only one instance of dishonesty, as opposed
to the two acts of dishonesty in Fresenius, and in Cooper Tire, the
conduct took place in the midst of a picket line, where heightened
tempers are expected and where the standard for conduct is
different from that in the workplace, as in Fresenius.373 In
addition, the comments in Cooper involved stereotypical
expectations regarding diet based upon race, whereas in
Fresenius the scribbling was “vulgar, offensive, and . . . arguably
threatening” to women employees who complained to
management, thereby prompting the carefully tailored
investigation.374
B.

Social Media Cases

In Triple Play,375 employees who complained on Facebook
about their boss’s inability to handle their payroll deductions for
tax purposes and other managerial matters were deemed
protected under the Act, even though the employee comments
were profane.376 The most important lesson learned from Triple
Play is that the Board will not apply the Atlantic Steel test to
cases involving social media, in light of the fact that the place of

370
371
372
373
374
375

Fresenius II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 2015 WL 3932160 (June 24, 2015).
Id. at *1.
See Cooper Tire, slip op. at 5.
See id. at 3–5; see generally Fresenius II, 2015 WL 3932160.
Cooper Tire, slip op. at 3–5; Fresenius II, 2015 WL 3932160, at *1.
Three D, LLC (Triple Play), 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 2014 WL 4182705 (Aug. 22,

2014).
376

Id. at *7.
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discussion in such cases is the Internet and not face-to-face in the
workplace.377 Thus, the employees’ comments in Triple Play
remained protected under the Jefferson Standard test because
the statements were not so disloyal or defamatory as to lose
protection, nor were they maliciously untrue.378 In addition, the
employer’s social media policy was found to be overly restrictive
of protected concerted activity, and its savings clause did not
save the policy from illegality.379 Thus, the employees were
entitled to reinstatement and backpay, and the Board required
revisions to the company’s Internet/Blogging policy as well as the
posting of a notice.380
In Bettie Page Clothing,381 the Board ordered reinstatement
and backpay to employees who were terminated for engaging in
protected concerted activity on social media, and it required
Bettie Page to revise its handbook confidentiality rule, which
forbade employees from disclosing wages and compensation to
each other or to third parties.382 The Board also ordered Bettie
Page to physically post at all of its stores and to distribute
electronically throughout the company a notice referencing the
ULPs and its intention not to commit the same again.383
In Pier Sixty,384 the profane social media posting that led to
employee Perez’s termination was inextricably linked to
protected concerted activity, including his clear support of the
union prior to an imminent NLRB election.385 The key takeaway
from the Board’s decision was that the posting was evaluated
under the “totality of the circumstances” with specific reference
to the following: the evidence of antiunion animus at the
company; the employer’s tolerance and managerial use of
profanity; its provocation of the employee and his impulsive
response; its rules against discussion; and its disproportionate

377
378
379
380
381

Id. at *4.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *1, *8–9.
Id. at *10–11.
Bettie Page Clothing II, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 2014 WL 5524147 (Oct. 31,

2014).
382

Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2. The Board noted that it relied upon Guardsmark, LLC, 344
N.L.R.B. 809 (2005) and Laurus Technical Institute, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 2014 WL
2705207 (June 13, 2014) for its order to post the notice regarding the handbook rule
violation companywide. Bettie Page Clothing II, 2014 WL 5524147, at *1 n.2.
384
Pier Sixty II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688 (Mar. 31, 2015).
385
Id. at *1–3.
383
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imposition of discipline on Perez.386 The three-member panel in
Pier Sixty cited Triple Play for the proposition that the Atlantic
Steel framework is generally inapplicable to social media cases,
preferring to evaluate the total circumstances to determine the
egregiousness of the comments—an approach that led the Board
to deem Perez’s conduct protected, resulting in reinstatement,
backpay, rule revision, and notice posting.387
In Tinley Park,388 the ALJ found that the employer violated
the NLRA by terminating banquet server Santiago for her
violation of its personal conduct and work rules, and for
violations of its standard operating procedure on cell phone
usage.389 The conduct leading up to Santiago’s discharge involved
employees taking pictures of each other as well as selfies with
Santiago’s phone and posting the pictures with sarcastic
comments on Santiago’s Facebook page, including one that
referenced the “no phones at work” policy that the employees
were in the process of violating.390 Santiago posted a picture of
the employees congregated in a hallway, quipping, “That’s how
we work at TPCC”; other comments referenced the amount of
work employees were doing, or not, as the case may be.391 The
pictures posted on Facebook and the comments depicting the
company in an unfavorable light were cited as reasons for
Santiago’s discharge.392 While the comments posted were not
truly profane, they did poke fun at the company, and Santiago
posted that she was “working like an [sic] slave.”393 In the
company’s view, all of Santiago’s posts were derogatory,
including the pictures that compromised public perception of the
convention center and its hospitality.394 In Tinley Park, the ALJ
focused on four unlawful work rules, finding that they chilled


386

Id. at *3.
Id. at *3, *5–6 (citing Three D, LLC (Triple Play), 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 2014
WL 4182705, at *4 (Aug. 22, 2014)).
388
Tinley Park Hotel & Convention Ctr., No. 13-CA-141609, 2015 WL 3759559
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges June 16, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-CA-141609.
389
Id. at 1–2.
390
Id. at 3–4.
391
Id. at 4.
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Id. at 4–5.
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Id.
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employees in exercising their § 7 rights.395 The takeaway from
this decision is that an employer must be careful of overbroad
rules that prohibit disloyalty or disparagement, discussion of
wage and salary information, discourteous or disrespectful
conduct, or disruptive conduct, and it must not discipline or
discharge employees for violating such overbroad rules that
interfere with protected concerted activities.
C.

Profanity on the Breakroom Wall and Dishonesty

The Board’s 2015 Fresenius396 decision focused on employee
Grosso’s dishonesty in the face of a properly run investigation
into offensive, profane, and arguably threatening comments and
drawings about which several female employees complained.397
The employer discharged Grosso for his comments and his
dishonesty and the Board upheld the discharge, noting that the
employer met its Wright Line burden that it would have
terminated Grosso for his dishonesty anyway even absent his
support of the union.398 The employer had discharged two other
employees solely for dishonesty in another investigation, and
thus the discipline of Grosso was not more severe due to his
exercise of § 7 rights.399 The critical takeaway from Fresenius is
that an employee who lies in an investigation into workplace
sexual harassment will be held accountable and will likely not be
reinstated, as such conduct is not protected activity under the
NLRA. Similarly, an employer who conducts a legitimate inquiry
into sexual harassment in the workplace is protected in doing so
as long as it does not exceed the boundaries of the legitimate
purpose of the investigation.
D. Takeaway from NLRB Profanity Cases
The takeaway from the top ten NLRB profanity cases is that
employers need to be very careful when enacting policies that
unduly restrict employee discussion of wages, hours, working
conditions, matters of mutual aid or protection under § 7 of the

395
Id. at 5, 10 (citing Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc. (Lutheran Heritage Vill.Livonia), 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 646–47 (2004); Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824,
825 (1998)).
396
Fresenius II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 2015 WL 3932160 (June 24, 2015).
397
Id. at *1–2.
398
Id. at *3 (citing Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1087 (1980)).
399
See id.
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Act, and when disciplining employees for violating such rules.
The NLRB deems discipline and discharge of employees for
violations of unduly restrictive employer rules illegal unless an
employer establishes special circumstances relating to its
business that justify restriction of § 7 rights, or unless the
employer can prove that there is a separate basis that would
have caused the employer to mete out the same discipline
anyway.
The differences between face-to-face and virtual
communication on email and social media primarily relate to the
place of the discussion.
The NLRB’s current approach on face-to-face workplace
profanity cases is to apply the test from Atlantic Steel.400 The
four factors from Atlantic Steel are: “(1) the place of the
discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature
of the employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in
any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair labor practice.”401 In
social media profanity cases, the Board currently uses a totality
of the circumstances test that invokes some of the factors from
Atlantic Steel, but not the first factor—the place of discussion—
because the discussion does not occur in the workplace.402 Under
the totality test, the Board considers all relevant factors that
reflect both the business interests of the employer in light of the
far-reaching virtual context and factors impacting the employee
and the exercise of § 7 rights.403 The employer is entitled to prove
special circumstances that require it to restrict activities that
interfere with its legitimate business interests; such interests
may allow for restrictions on employee use of profanity,
particularly in a retail context.404
The employer’s own use of profanity, the professed moral
values of those running the business, and the image of the
company projected through its actions and advertising may all be
considered when weighing the legality of employer rules that

400

245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979).
Id. at 816.
402
The Board first noted this in Three D, LLC (Triple Play), 361 N.L.R.B. No.
31, 2014 WL 4182705, at *4 (Aug. 22, 2014), and reiterated the point in its decision
in Pier Sixty II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688, at *3 (Mar. 31, 2015).
403
Pier Sixty II, 2015 WL 1457688, at *3.
404
See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945); see also
supra notes 148–56 and accompanying text (discussing Member Miscimarra’s
concurrence in the Starbucks case regarding recommended limits of protection on
employee concerted activity in retail settings).
401
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restrict employee communication, including profanity.405
Managers who use profanity themselves or allow its use by other
employees may not single out an employee who is engaged in
protected concerted activity and discipline him or her for use of
profanity.406 That kind of managerial action constitutes unequal
treatment based upon the exercise of § 7 rights and is thus an
ULP.
The factors that the Board considers under the totality of the
circumstances test include the following: employer wrongdoing,
including evidence of antiunion animus; provocation of the
employee by the employer; disproportionate punishment for those
engaging in protected concerted activities; and any history of
employer ULPs.407 The totality of the circumstances test also
weighs: the time of the employee posting, that is, whether on
non-work time, break time, or work time; the impact of the
employee’s posting on the employer’s legitimate business
interests; and whether, under the Wright Line test, the employer
has shown that the employee would have been disciplined or
discharged anyway, even without engaging in protected
The Board has also looked to what
concerted activity.408
employer rules relating to profanity have routinely proved
problematic under the Act. The resulting decisions outline an
expectation that employer rules relating to employee profanity
must be carefully drawn to allow employees to exercise § 7 rights,
and the rules should provide specific examples of prohibited
conduct to avoid ambiguity that leads employees to fear
exercising their statutory rights.409 Rules that reasonably tend to
chill employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights or those that
explicitly restrict activities protected by § 7 are unlawful absent a
showing of special circumstances.410
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Pier Sixty II, 2015 WL 1457688, at *3.
Id. at *4.
407
Id. at *3.
408
See generally Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980).
409
See generally Memorandum from Richard F. Griffin, Jr., Gen. Counsel,
NLRB, to All Reg’l Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers regarding
the Report of the Gen. Counsel Concerning Employer Rules, GC 15-04 (Mar. 18,
2015) (detailing recent employer rule cases with examples of lawful and unlawful
rules on confidentiality, courtesy, employee conduct and communications, social
media policies, cell phone use, and profanity).
410
See Three D, LLC (Triple Play), 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 2014 WL 4182705, at
*8 nn.22–23 (first citing Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998); then
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CONCLUSION
The ten NLRB cases involving profanity illustrate the limits
that the NLRA presently places upon managers with respect to
discipline of employees who engage in conduct that is protected
by § 7 of the Act. Employee conduct may be vulgar, profane, and
offensive and yet remain protected, or it may not be protected if
the conduct is so egregious, dishonest, threatening, violent or
insubordinate that it exceeds the Act’s protection.411 Employer
rules relating to employee communication must not unduly
restrict employees’ exercise of their § 7 rights. If they do, the
NLRB will require the employer to revise the rules. As Board
Member Johnson’s term recently ended,412 the changing
composition of the NLRB may result in even more protection for
employee profanity in the future, as Johnson has been more
inclined than most Board members to find that offensive, profane
language loses the protection of the Act.413


citing Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc. (Lutheran Heritage Vill.-Livonia), 343
N.L.R.B. 646, 646 (2004)).
411
See Richmond Dist. Neighborhood Ctr., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 2014 WL
5465462, at *3 (Oct. 28, 2014) (finding Facebook exchange of student employees at
teen center was insubordinate misconduct and not protected by the Act).
412
See Harry I. Johnson, III, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-weare/board/harry-i-johnson-iii (last visited May 19, 2016). Member Johnson’s term
ended August 27, 2015. Id.
413
See Pier Sixty II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688, at *5 (Mar. 31,
2015) (Member Johnson, dissenting in part); Plaza Auto III, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 117,
2014 WL 2213747, at *19 (May 28, 2014) (Member Johnson, dissenting); Fresenius
II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 2015 WL 3932160, at *1 n.2 (June 24, 2015) (noting that
Member Johnson would not find that the handwritten statements of the
complainant were protected). Cf. Starbucks IV, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 2014 WL
2736112, at *10 (June 16, 2014) (Member Miscimarra, concurring) (noting that he
would find that a retail employee such as Agins, who causes disruption or
interference with the business, even when off duty, loses the protection of the Act).

